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Abstract
Bitcoin is a virtual currency scheme that is characterised by a decentralised
network and cryptographic transfer verification which has been attracting much
public attention due to its technological innovation and its high exchange rate
volatility. In this paper, Bitcoin’s exchange rate movement from 2011 to 2018 and
its relationship with the global financial markets are explored using an EGARCH
framework. The results are as follows. First, fundamentals and Bitcoin-related events
play a critical role in the exchange rate formation of Bitcoin. Second, the impact of
regulation-related events on Bitcoin indicates that market sentiment is responding to
market regulation statements. Third, news coverage is an essential factor in driving
the volatility of Bitcoin. Fourth, Bitcoin may be a hedge in times of calm financial
markets and a safe haven against uncertain economic policy but is likely to expose
to flight-to-quality as global financial uncertainty increases. Lastly, the positive effect
of the central bank’s announcements on Bitcoin is marginal enough to rule out the
involvement of global expansionary monetary policy in inflating Bitcoin’s exchange
rate over the past years, as it may have been the case with traditional asset prices
after the great recession.
Keywords: Bitcoin, EGARCH, event analysis, Reuters news, VIX, EPU, financial
markets
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1 Introduction
Bitcoin is the most successful virtual currency scheme to date. Designed by an
anonymous person or a group of people named Satoshi Nakamoto in 2009, the scheme
is based on a P2P transaction network (Nakamoto, 2008). Unlike previous closed or uni-
directional flow virtual currencies, Bitcoin is created by a transaction verification process
and is freely convertible against fiat currencies through several online exchanges. Con-
sidered bymany as a digital tulip and not backed by any real value or government decree,
Bitcoin has gained public interest which eventually led to explosive exchange rate trends,
almost matching the value of one ounce of gold at the end of November 2013 and hitting
above $19,000 in December 2017 before fluctuating around $6,500 in September 2018.1
Although the Bitcoin network with sheer computing power reaches more than 300 times
the combined power of the top 500 supercomputers (Garcia and Schweitzer, 2015), it can
only process seven transactions per second, which is a drop compared to Visa and Mas-
terCard that handle thousands of payments per second. However, Bitcoin’s fast transna-
tional transaction speed, low transaction fees and virtually unbreakable cryptography
foreshadow an artefact of a future medium of exchange, and its underlying technology
is considered as innovative compared to the traditional financial architecture and is be-
ing examined by several institutions and companies for potential adoption as a financial
infrastructure technology.
The exceptional level of volatility in such a fast-growing market naturally raises the
question of which forces determine Bitcoin’s exchange rate and whether there is any con-
nection between Bitcoin and the world economy. This paper takes into account a wide
range of potential driving forces of the exchange rate level and volatility of Bitcoin in
an EGARCH framework, first, to explore to what degree the BTC/USD exchange rate is
driven by factors such as fundamentals, information flows, regulatory stance, monetary
policy, economic uncertainties, and Bitcoin-specific events, and, second, to determine Bit-
coin’s hedging and safe haven capabilities.2
To the best knowledge, this paper is the first paper dealing with the impact of
regulation-related statements on the exchange rate dynamics of Bitcoin. The results are
manifold and as follows. First, the results support the findings of the previous literature
emphasising the role of fundamentals and Bitcoin-related specific events in explaining
Bitcoin’s volatile exchange rate dynamics, as suggested by a sharp decline in the volatil-
ity persistence, leverage effect and fat tail behaviour after the corresponding variables are
incorporated into the model. Moreover, regulation-related events play a significant role
in driving the exchange rate of Bitcoin, providing some implications for policymakers
1The exchange rate of Bitcoin peaked at USD 1,242 per Bitcoin on 29 November 2013, while gold was
trading at USD 1,250 an ounce.
2BTC is the abbreviation for Bitcoin. Moreover, according to Baur and Lucey (2010), a hedge is an asset
which is uncorrelated or negatively correlated with other assets on average, while a safe haven is an
asset which shows these properties only in times of markets distress.
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and regulators regarding the sentiment of Bitcoin investors towards market regulation.
Expansionary monetary policy worldwide and uncertainty events have a limited, albeit
significant positive impact on the exchange rate of Bitcoin. However, since this effect
is somewhat marginal, it can be ruled out that an exceptionally loose monetary policy
worldwide has contributed to the rise in the Bitcoin exchange rate in recent years, as
might have been the case with traditional asset prices. The results also stress the impor-
tance of news coverage in driving the volatility of Bitcoin. Concerning Bitcoin’s hedging
and safe haven capabilities, the results find a non-linear relationship to global uncer-
tainty, as well as a negative relationship to global stock markets. In fact, in times of calm
financial markets, Bitcoin can serve as a hedging instrument. However, in times of finan-
cial market distress, Bitcoin moves with the markets and therefore does not act as a safe
haven against stock market crashes. Bitcoin’s safe haven capability is found to be only
granted in times of high economic uncertainty. Overall, the empirical findings of this
paper contrast with studies that find that the Bitcoin market is completely isolated from
the world economy.
This paper is structured as follows. After a brief review of related literature in Sec-
tion 2, Section 3 highlights the relevance of the chosen variables. The model design, as
well as the empirical results, are described in Section 4. The final section of the paper
represents a summary of substantial findings, along with a few concluding remarks.
2 Related literature
The increasing popularity of Bitcoin has also attracted the attention of economists,
and a considerable amount of exchange rate literature on Bitcoin has emerged. Much at-
tention of earlier literature is being paid to the question of whether Bitcoin is a currency
or a speculative asset, and various papers point to the existence of market bubbles in the
Bitcoin market caused by public interest (see e.g. Buchholz et al., 2012; Kristoufek, 2013;
Yermack, 2013; Glaser et al., 2014; Garcia and Schweitzer, 2015; Bouoiyour and Selmi,
2015b).3 A fraction of the later literature deals with the characterization of Bitcoin as
well, and Cheah and Fry (2015) state the absence of a fundamental value for Bitcoin. Bar-
tos et al. (2015) find Bitcoin follows the hypothesis of efficient markets, which is in sharp
contrast with the finding of Cheah et al. (2018). However, the findings regarding a larger
body of newer works such as Urquhart (2016), Khuntia and Pattanayak (2018), Wei (2018)
3A number of papers which deal with investigating various economic indicators by using search volume
index (SVI) from Google Trends have emerged over the past years (Da et al., 2011; Choi and Varian, 2012;
Preis et al., 2013; Scott and Varian, 2015). Several works such as Bank et al. (2011), Aouadi et al. (2013),
and Ding and Hou (2015) show that the SVI from Google Trends can serve as an adequate proxy for retail
investor attention. In this sense, it would be interesting here to consider the impact of the SVI on Bitcoin’s
exchange rate dynamics. However, when the observation range exceeds 90 days, the SVI is only available
on a weekly basis, which means we cannot use its data because our study is based on daily data.
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and Bariviera (2017) are more differentiated and conclude that the Bitcoin market is over-
all inefficient, but there is evidence that Bitcoin may become more efficient over time.
The main part of the later exchange rate literature focuses on the driving forces of
Bitcoin’s exchange rate dynamics. A number of papers emphasise the role of underlying
market forces in driving Bitcoin’s exchange rate. MacDonell (2014) and Baek and Elbeck
(2015) suggest that Bitcoin’s exchange rate dynamics are primarily driven by investors
looking outside traditional markets. Koutmos (2018) points to the importance of market
microstructure and finds close linkages between Bitcoin returns and transaction activ-
ity. Balcilar et al. (2017) highlight the importance of modelling nonlinearity and find that
volume can predict returns in relatively tranquil times of the Bitcoin market. Kristoufek
(2015) finds some evidence that, despite being a speculative asset, Bitcoin is influenced
by standard fundamental factors in the long term.
Several works deal with the interaction between Bitcoin’s exchange rate dynamics
and macro-financial factors. Van Wijk (2013) finds evidence that macro-financial factors
have a significant impact on the value of Bitcoin. In sharp contrast, Ciaian et al. (2016)
find that Bitcoin is detached from economic fundamentals. However, newer works such
as Bouri et al. (2018a) and Corbet et al. (2018) conclude that the Bitcoin market is not
entirely isolated. Similarly, Brière et al. (2015) find that Bitcoin investment delivers high
diversification benefits due to low correlations with other financial assets.
The capability of Bitcoin as a hedge and a safe haven has also been explored.
Dyhrberg (2016a) shows that Bitcoin is very similar to gold due to volatility persis-
tence and symmetry, thus considering Bitcoin as a potential hedge against market risks.
Walther et al. (2018) and Al-Khazali et al. (2018) compare the reactions of gold and Bit-
coin to macroeconomic news surprises and concludes that Bitcoin cannot serve as a safe
haven. Works such as Bouri et al. (2017b), Bouri et al. (2018b), Bouri et al. (2017a), and
Demir et al. (2018) support the idea of Bitcoin being a safe haven or a hedge against eco-
nomic downturn and uncertainty by testing the relationship between Bitcoin and global
uncertainty measures, and Dyhrberg (2016b) shows that Bitcoin can serve as a hedge
against the stock market.
Regarding market sentiment, Polasik et al. (2015) discover that Bitcoin’s exchange
rate is driven by the sentiment expressed in newspaper reports on cryptocurrency, and re-
ports a weak association between Bitcoin returns and global macroeconomic aggregates.
Gronwald (2014) shows that extreme movements of Bitcoin are mainly characterised by
special events often caused by exceptional news. To capture the overall sentiment in
the Bitcoin-dominated cryptocurrency market, Härdle and Trimborn (2015) construct a
capitalisation-weighted index as a benchmark for a wide range of cryptocurrencies and
finds the corresponding volatility level is generally very high and comparable to that of
risky stock markets like the Greece or Russian one.
The impact of political events on Bitcoin has also been researched, and Luther and
Olson (2013) take a closer look at the relationship between the Cyprus bailout announce-
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ment in 2013 and the subsequent surge in downloads for popular Bitcoin apps. The
same phenomenon could also be observed during the Greek crisis, according to Bouoiy-
our et al. (2015). Glouderman (2014) finds that China has become the market maker
and that the closure of the bank accounts of Chinese Bitcoin exchanges due to pressure
from the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) may cause a shift in Bitcoin trading activities
from mainland China to Hong Kong. A number of academic papers also deal with the
relationship between Bitcoin and monetary policy. Most of these papers are theoreti-
cal and deal with the challenges of Bitcoin on monetary policy. Two empirical papers
deal with the impact of monetary policy on Bitcoins exchange rate. Corbet et al. (2017)
state that Bitcoins volatility is significantly driven by monetary policy announcements,
whereas Vidal-Tomás and Ibañez (2018) find that both the level and volatility of Bitcoin’s
exchange rate is not affected by monetary policy announcements. Finally, Table 1 gives a
summary of the cited exchange rate literature and associated methodology.
In addition to the relevant exchange rate literature, some policy-related literature is
also illuminated. Financial authorities such as central banks and International Monetary
Fund (IMF) emphasise monetary and financial stability issues in case of broad adoption
of Bitcoin. European Central Bank (2012) discusses whether the Bitcoin network is a
Ponzi scheme or not. Bank of Canada (2014) expresses its concerns about potential risks
to financial stability if Bitcoins were to become mainstream. Ali et al. (2014) question the
adoption of Bitcoins in the long run on account of a variety of incentive problems and rule
out a potential risk to monetary and financial stability in the UK owing to the Bitcoin’s
irrelevant status as a payment system. Moreover, the Bank of England (2015) discusses
the possibility of issuing central bank-backed virtual currencies and the related conse-
quences. He et al. (2016) point out potential benefits as well as considerable risks from
using virtual currencies. While potential benefits of an implementation of the under-
lying blockchain technology of virtual currencies in established financial structures are
particularly highlighted, financial stability would be exposed to potential risks if virtual
currencies were to become widely used. To respond to the challenges posed by virtual
currencies, an international framework for regulating the use of virtual currencies is to
be established.
Regarding the feasibility of the implementation of the underlying blockchain tech-
nology of virtual currencies in established financial structures, Mainelli and Milne (2016)
from the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) insti-
tute find that while the use of blockchain for payment clearing and securities settlement
can lead to substantial reductions in transaction cost and risk, substantial challenges
such as long-term commitment of time and resource and active regulatory support are
involved in adapting existing processes and integrating them with the blockchain tech-
nology. Last but not least, Bitcoin entered the stage of world-leading academic textbooks,
as the eleventh edition of Mishkin (2016) questions the potential role of Bitcoin as the
money of the future, albeit highlighting the potential of its underlying technology for fu-
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Table 1: Summary of related exchange rate literature
Authors Methodology Key results
Market bubbles
Kristoufek (2013) VAR/VECM Yes, Bitcoin’s exchange rate is driven by public interests, as measured by search queries on Google
Trends and Wikipedia.
Yermack (2013) Descriptive statistics Yes, Bitcoin appears to behave more like a speculative investment than a currency.
Glaser et al. (2014) GARCH Yes, Bitcoin is rather a speculative asset than as a currency, highlighted by reaction bias of Bitcoin’s
returns towards positive news.
Garcia and Schweitzer (2015) VAR Yes, Bitcoin’s excessive returns is driven social media sentiment.
Buchholz et al. (2012) GARCH Yes, Bitcoin’s volatility has a significant positive effect on its return, which is characteristic for
asset bubbles.
Cheah and Fry (2015) LPPL Yes, Bitcoin exhibits market bubbles and the fundamental value of Bitcoin is zero.
Market efficiency
Bartos et al. (2015) ECM Yes, Bitcoin follows the efficient market hypothesis (EMH), as it immediately reacts on publicly
announce information.
Cheah et al. (2018) FCVAR No, the Bitcon market is inefficient as Bitcoin’s exchange rate follows a long-memory process.
Urquhart (2016) Hypothesis tests Partially yes, the Bitcoin market is overall inefficient but may become more efficient over time.
Khuntia and Pattanayak (2018) Rolling hypothesis tests Partially yes, Bitcon’s market efficiency evolves with time.
Wei (2018) Hypothesis tests Partially yes, the Bitcoin market becomes more efficient as its volatility level is decreasing and its
liquidity gets higher.
Bariveria (2017) Rolling hypothesis tests Partially yes, Bitcoin’s return becomes more efficient since 2014 but its volatility exhibits long
memory throughout the sample.
Fundamentals
MacDonell (2014) ARMA/LPPL A primary driving force of Bitcoin’s exchange rate is speculation by investors looking outside
traditional markets, as suggest by an inverse relationship between Bitcoin and VIX.
Baek and Elbeck (2015) OLS Bitcoin’s extraordinarily high level of volatility is purely driven by buyers and sellers, since only
the bid-ask spread of Bitcoin is significant, which is not the case for macro-financial factors.
Kristoufek (2015) Wavelet analysis Bitcoin is a speculative asset but is still influenced by
1. the supply,
2. the price level,
3. and the trading volume in the long term.
Balcilar et al. (2017) Granger-causality Trading volume can predict Bitcoin’s returns in times of a calm Bitcoin market.
Koutmos (2018) VAR Bitcoin’s returns are bidirectionally linked to transaction activities, stressing the role of market
microstructure in explaining Bitcoin’s returns.
Political events
Luther and Olson (2013) Descriptive statistics A surge in downloads for popular Bitcoin apps and a significant increase in the exchange rate of
Bitcoin followed the initial announcement of the Cyprus bailout.
Bouoiyour et al. (2015) Granger-causality The relationship from the related Google searches and the number of tweets to Bitcoin is signifi-
cant in the short- and the medium-run.
Glouderman (2014) Descriptive statistics The PBoC’s efforts to curb Bitcoin’s trading activities have led to price fluctuations in the global
Bitcoin market, and further pressure from the PBoC may cause a shift in Bitcoin trading activities
from mainland China to Hong Kong.
Monetary policy
Corbet et al. (2017) GARCH Yes, Bitcoin’s volatility is significantly driven by international monetary policy announcements.
Vidal-Tomás and Ibanez (2018) GARCH No, both the level and the volatility of Bitcoin’s exchange rate are not affected by international
monetary policy announcements.
Market sentiment
Polasik et al. (2015) OLS Bitcoin’s returns are driven by
1. the sentiment expressed in newspaper reports on cryptocurrency,
2. Bitcoins popularity,
3. and the total number of transactions.
Gronwald (2014) ARJI-GARCH Bitcoin’s extreme movements are characterised by one-off events.
Härdle and Trimborn (2015) Laspeyres/GARCH 1. A capitalisation-weighted index for a wide range of cryptocurrencies is constructed.
2. And the volatility level of the index is comparable to that of Russian or Greek stock markets.
Linkages between Bitcoin and macro-finanical factors
Van Wijk (2013) OLS/ECM Yes, significant impact of macro-finanical factors on Bitcoin’s exchange rate.
Bouri et al. (2018a) VAR-GARCH-M Yes, the Bitcoin market is completely not isolated and receives more volatility than it transmits to
financial markets.
Ciaian et al. (2016) VAR/ARDL/VECM No, little support for effects of macro-financial factors on Bitcoin’s exchange rate in the long run.
Corbet et al. (2018) VAR No, the Bitcoin market is isolated from financial markets and may offer diversification benefits.
Brière et al. (2015) Descriptive statistics No, Bitcoin’s correlation with other assets is low and may offer diversification benefits.
Bitcoin as a hedge or a safe haven
Dyhrberg (2016a) GARCH Yes, Bitcoin is similar to gold due to volatility persistence and symmetry and thus may serve as a
hedge against market risk.
Bouri et al. (2017a) GARCH Yes, Bitcoin serves as a safe haven as stock market downturn in the pre-crash period of 2013.
Bouri et al. (2017b) QQ Yes, Bitcoin serves as a hedge at both lower and upper quantiles of Bitcoin returns and global
uncertainty.
Bouri et al. (2018b) Copula-based QQ Yes, Bitcoin can serve as a safe haven against global financial stress at the lower and higher quan-
tiles of the Bitcoin returns.
Demir et al. (2018) VAR/OLS/QQ Yes, Bitcoin serves a hedge against economic poliy uncertainty at the lower and higher quantiles
of the Bitcoin returns and the EPU.
Dyhrberg (2016b) GARCH Yes, Bitccoin can serve as a hedge against the stock market.
Walther et al. (2018) BEKK-GARCH No, Bitcoin tends to move with the markets in times of market distress and cannot serve as a safe
haven. It is also not a hedge instrument in a portfolio component.
Al-Khazali et al. (2018) GARCH/EGARCH No, Bitcoin reacts differently from gold to macroeconomic news surprises and therefore cannot
serve as a safe haven.
Notes: VAR stands for vector autoregression, VECM for vector error correction model, GARCH for generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic-
ity, LPPL for log-periodic power law, ECM for error correction model, FCVAR for fractionally cointegrated VAR, ARMA for autoregressive moving average,
OLS for ordinary least squares, ARJI-GARCH for autoregressive jump-intensity GARCH, Laspeyres for the Laspeyres index formula, VAR-GARCH-M for VAR-
GARCH-in-mean, ARDL for autoregressive distributed lag, QQ for quantile-on-quantile regressions, BEKK for the multivariate GARCH model defined by citet-
baba1990multivariate, and EGARCH for exponential GARCH.
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ture payment systems.
The existing literature has several research gaps. First, as the general opinion is that
the exchange rate of Bitcoin is affected mainly by specific events inside and outside the
Bitcoin market, it is desirable to quantify the impact of those specific events. Second, to
the best knowledge, only Polasik et al. (2015) has focused on the impact of the related
press coverage on Bitcoin’s exchange rate dynamics. As Bitcoin is widely regarded as a
speculative asset, the impact of news would play a significant role in the exchange rate
dynamics mechanism. Third, despite its volatile nature, Bitcoin is perceived by many
as a hedge and safe haven against global market turmoil. In this context, it should be
examined whether Bitcoin’s movement is affected by global economic outlook and finan-
cial markets movements. Lastly, taking into account the previous points, as the literature
cites a wide range of factors influencing the exchange rate of Bitcoin, a significant short-
coming of previous work is that its studies often focus only on certain driving forces of
Bitcoin’s exchange rate and omits others, resulting in biased inference when performing
econometric estimations. Therefore, a broad-based analysis is needed to ensure a correct
statistical inference. To some extent, this paper attempts to fill these gaps by quantifying
the impact of market forces, specific events, press coverage, macro-financial uncertain-
ties, and global financial markets on Bitcoin’s exchange rate dynamics in an estimation
framework with a wide range of corresponding explanatory variables.
3 Data
The daily time series of BTC/USD exchange rates used for the investigation is drawn
from Coindesk at www.coindesk.com/price. The time series starts on 16 March 2011 and
ends on 21 June 2018, based on data availability of subsequent time series. Coindesk’s
exchange rate represents an average of exchange rates on the leading Bitcoin exchanges
and therefore better describes the Bitcoin exchange rate globally than that of a single ex-
change. It is worth noting that Bitcoin exchanges never close at weekends and holidays.
Looking at the movement behaviour of the BTC/USD exchange rate, it is evident
that Bitcoin’s exchange rate volatility is vastly higher than that of any commodities, stock
indices, and currencies. Four comparisons are given in Figure 1. First, as the world’s
most-traded commodity, the falling price of crude oil as from end-2014 owing to gen-
eral oversupply and China’s economic slowdown led to drastic fluctuations in the price
movement. Yet these fluctuations are just on par with the day-to-day fluctuations of the
Bitcoin exchange rate in the corresponding period. Second, as an example for a volatile
emerging market stock index, the bursting of the Chinese stock market bubble in the
second half of 2015 is accompanied by a sharp rise in volatility of Shanghai Composite
index, which is also on a similar level as Bitcoin’s volatility. Third, despite many similar-
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Figure 1: Bitcoin exchange rate volatility
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Sources: Coindesk; Quandl; Reuters Datastream.
Notes: FX Rate is the abbreviation for foreign exchange rate, and BRL is the abbreviation for Brazilian
real. The missing data on weekends and holidays are imputed via the Last-Observation-Carried-Forward
method.
ities between gold and Bitcoin, such as inelastic supply, costly production process, and
lack of government backing, gold maintains its value above USD 1,000 over time as its
daily price return fluctuates mostly within 2%, while Bitcoin’s exchange rate return fluc-
tuates mostly within 10%. Fourth, when comparing Bitcoin with Brazilian real, as one of
the world’s most volatile currency, Bitcoin’s average fluctuation is roughly seven times
larger than that of the latter one.
At the current stage, Bitcoin’s exchange rate dynamics cannot be explained by the
acceptance beyond its trading purpose, as the vast majority of the activity among Bitcoin
users consists of speculation rather than real payments (Goldman Sachs, 2014). Accord-
ing to Bitpay (2017), a leading Bitcoin payment processor, payment transactions only
make up about 2.5% of total transactions as of November 2016. As the share of real pay-
ments is, mostly, far lower than 1% throughout Bitcoin’s transaction timeline, the driving
forces behind Bitcoin’s growth are to be found outside its underlying economy.
For the following quantitative analysis of the Bitcoin exchange rate, potential in-
fluencing factors such as fundamentals, information flows, regulatory stance, monetary
policy, economic uncertainties, global financial markets, and Bitcoin-specific events will
be described in the next subsections. This serves as amotivation for choosing explanatory
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variables for the further steps.
Fundamentals
The website www.Blockchain.info provides a wealth of statistics about the Bitcoin
market. Many times series are available on a daily basis and provide a comprehensive
insight into the activities within the market. The following stationary daily times series
extracted from the website will be used in our analysis.4 (i) The percentage change in
the hash rate; (ii) The percentage change in the number of transactions; (iii) The loga-
rithm of miners revenue in BTC; (iv) The logarithm of trading volume in BTC. A hash
function is a function that transforms an unencrypted message into a short, fixed-length
output. A hash is the output of a hash function and, as it relates to Bitcoin, the hash rate
describes the number of found adequate hash values per second in a transaction verifica-
tion process. A higher hash rate indicates a higher processing power, as it increases the
opportunity of receiving the Bitcoin reward. The unit of account of the hash rate is giga
hash per second (GH/s). The revenue of miners is composed of the numbers of Bitcoins
mined per day and the aggregated transaction fees. Given that the level of transaction
fees tends to be negligible mostly over time, the revenue of miners is approximately equal
to the number of Bitcoins mined per day, representing the daily money growth of Bitcoin.
Lastly, the logarithm of the daily illiquidity measure proposed by Amihud (2002), being
the ratio of absolute Bitcoin return and its dollar trading volume, is used to measure the
liquidity of Bitcoin. As such, a higher value of the measure indicates lower liquidity. The
Amihud (2002) measure is one of the most widely used liquidity proxies in the finance
literature due to its simplicity and robustness.
Economic uncertainties and financial markets
Looking back at Bitcoin’s exchange rate rally during the crisis in Cyprus in 2013 as
well as in Greece in 2015, Bitcoin appears to benefit from political and financial uncer-
tainty. To contribute to the debate on whether Bitcoin can be a hedge against uncertainty
or a safe haven in times of market distress, prominent measures for uncertainty are used.
The first measure is the price of gold, which is commonly seen as a hedge and a safe
haven, as it has historically maintained its real value over time. The relationship between
gold and assets such as equities, bonds, and US dollars has been widely studied in the
literature relying on homoskedastic regression and GARCH-type models (see, e.g., Baur
and Lucey 2010; Baur andMcDermott 2010; Capie et al. 2005; Ghosh et al. 2004; Joy 2011).
The literature widely agrees that gold serves as a hedge against stocks and US dollar but
not bonds. While some publications, such as Baur and Glover (2016), question the safe
4To test on stationarity of the times series, we use a unit root test developed by Perron (1997), which con-
siders one endogenously determined structural break in the intercept. The results are available upon
request.
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haven property of gold, the widely-held view among economists is that when markets
become turbulent, some investors tend to convert their assets into gold, which drives up
its price up, thus serving as insurance against adverse market events. Moreover, gold
is also positively affected by unfavourable (surprising) macroeconomic news (see, e.g.,
Roache and Rossi 2010; Caporale et al. 2017).
The secondmeasure, the daily Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) index constructed
by Baker et al. (2015), reflects the frequency of articles containing uncertainty-related
words in 1,500 U.S. newspapers. As such, a higher EPU value implies increased un-
certainty about future economic policy. Several papers using the EPU index have been
published in the last years which deal with the impact of economic policy uncertainty on
macroeconomic fundamentals. For example, Karnizova and Li (2014) and Balcilar et al.
(2016) emphasise the capability of high-frequency EPU values in forecasting recessionary
regimes for the U.S. economy. Considering that Bitcoin is mainly traded outside the U.S.,
it should be noted that the EPU index is geared to the U.S. economy as most newspapers
are likely to report mainly on domestic uncertainty issues. However, it is certain that (i)
U.S. newspapers also will report on major uncertainty-related events outside the U.S.,
and, (ii) that uncertainties arising from the U.S. economy as the largest economy in the
world will affect the global economy. In this context, the EPU index can also serve as an
indicator providing valuable information on the expected uncertainty about the political
and economic climate at a global level.
The third measure, the global VIX (GVIX) index, is constructed in the spirit of Bouri
et al. (2017b) and represents the first principal component of volatility indices (VIXs) of
14 developed and developing stock markets. The stock markets of Brazil, Canada, China,
France, Germany, India, Japan, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, the
UK, and the US are taken into account. Additionally, it is scaled to the level of the VIX
by using the min-max normalisation with minimum and maximum of the VIX to avoid
negative values and to facilitate the interpretation of this global measure. A volatility
index is a forward-looking volatility measure which represents expected future market
volatility over the next 30 calendar days by averaging the current prices of the respective
stock market index options. Often referred to as the "fear index", a high volatility value
represents increased financial market uncertainty. In other words, investors buy stock
market index put options when they fear a potential decline in the stock market, result-
ing in a surge in the VIX. The well-known US VIX index based on S&P 500 has become
a standard measure for US and global uncertainty in empirical finance and economics
literature (Bloom, 2009; Mody, 2009). Against this background, the GVIX index is used to
obtain a better measure for global uncertainty than the US VIX index. It is worth noting
that VIX and EPU follow different concepts. While the EPU index attempts to capture
economic policy uncertainty, a VIX index echoes financial market uncertainty. Two mea-
sures are used with the aim of capturing different types of macroeconomic uncertainty.
Lastly, to check the relationship between Bitcoin and global stock markets, the stock
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market indices S&P Global 1200, MSCI World, and MSCI Emerging Market (EM) in-
cluded. The S&P Global 1200 index is a stock market index capturing 31 countries
and about 70 per cent of global stock market capitalisation. It thus reflects the over-
all performance of the stock markets worldwide. The MSCI World represents a collec-
tion of around 1,600 shares from 23 industrialised countries. As such, it serves as a
standard benchmark for measuring stock market performance in industrialised coun-
tries. Similarly, the MSCI EM consists of nearly 850 stocks from 23 major emerging
economies and is used to measure the stock market performance in developing coun-
tries. All variables are drawn from Datastream, except the EPU, which is drawn from the
www.policyuncertainty.com.
Events dummies
Three types of events are considered in this paper: regulatory events, monetary pol-
icy events, and Bitcoin-specific events. First of all, it should be mentioned that the events
in these three sets from September 2011 to December 2017 are taken from the Bitcoin-
related set of Vidal-Tomás and Ibañez (2018), who updated the corresponding event set
of Feng et al. (2017) with the aim of creating a database of events that could be used by
different authors, and also provided an event set describing the main monetary policy
announcements worldwide. These events are divided into positive and negative events,
whereby the value of an event on a respective day is one and zero otherwise. As such,
they enter the study as dummy variables in the form D+/-· = 1 if a positive/negative event
occurs, 0 otherwise.
The events relevant to regulation on Bitcoin are taken from the policy-related events
from the Bitcoin-related event of Vidal-Tomás and Ibañez (2018) from June 2013 to De-
cember 2017. From January 2018 onwards, the news collection software Factiva will be
used to find all news of Reuters relevant to Bitcoin regulation using the search term "Bit-
coin". Consequently, the event set will be extended until 21 June 2018, which is the cut-off
date for this paper. The details are found in Table 6 in the Appendix. There are 20 posi-
tive and 37 negative events, as proxied by the dummies D+/-REGT. The positive events relate
in particular to a more open attitude by the authorities towards Bitcoin, including the
renunciation of greater regulation, the approval of licenses for Bitcoin business activities
and the recognition of Bitcoin as a payment method. The negative events are mostly
related to statements by authorities warning investors of risks in dealing with Bitcoin,
indicating the need for stronger regulation, and determining or suggesting the handling
of Bitcoin by financial institutions.
The international monetary policy event set used in this paper is based on the mone-
tary policy event set of Vidal-Tomás and Ibañez (2018) and is extended to include all ma-
jor monetary policy announcements from Federal Reserve (FED), the European Central
Bank (ECB), the Bank of Japan (BoJ), and the Bank of England (BoE) between 16 March
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2011 and 21 June 2018. Additionally, five bailout- and Brexit-related events are removed
from the set to ensure a straight monetary policy event set. Following the approach of
Vidal-Tomás and Ibañez (2018), each of the added events is first classified according to
whether the event is expansionary or contractionary. That is, expansionary (respectively,
contractionary) policies are classified as positive (respectively, negative) events. Then the
reaction of the respective stock market, namely S&P 500, EuroStoxx 50, FTSE 100 and
Nikkei 225, is reviewed on the given event day to correct the classification if necessary.
A positive (respectively, negative) reaction of the respective stock market indicates a sur-
prising loosening (respectively, tightening) of monetary policy. The set is described in
Table 8 in the Appendix. Overall, the set contains 57 events, of which 40 are positive and
17 are negative events, as proxied by D+/-MP. The majority of the statements is predomi-
nantly positive, as the international monetary policy stance has mainly been loose since
the outbreak of the financial crisis and monetary policy appears to be slowly returning to
normal, as the recovery of the global economy has progressed slowly since then.
Regarding the specific events related to Bitcoin, all the policy events are removed
from the Bitcoin-related event set of Vidal-Tomás and Ibañez (2018), which is then ex-
tended until 21 June 2018, as described in Table 8 in the Appendix. Overall, of a total of
44 events, 18 are positive and 26 negative. The positive (respectively, negative) events are
represented by D+/-SE . It is striking that while the negative events often involve hacking
events, the positive events are mostly related to the acceptance of Bitcoin as a payment
method and the entry of Bitcoin into the financial market.
The presentation of the event dummies ends with a brief reminder of the limita-
tions of using dummy variables in regression analysis. Although dummy coding is a
powerful tool for describing various qualitative events, its outcome needs to be care-
fully interpreted. Severe multicollinearity can occur when all dummy variables enter the
estimation simultaneously. Hence, regression estimations are carried out by including
dummy variables sequentially. As in all regression analysis, dummy variables can carry
some effects from unobserved factors, resulting in omitted variables bias. Lastly, some
crucial events can also be missing in a dummy variable, which may also lead to omitted
variables bias.
News coverage
It has been widely studied whether investors’ trading decisions are influenced to
some degree by news coverage related to the corresponding asset. Since Bitcoin has been
attracting public attention since 2013, a considerable amount of articles can be found in
the mainstream press. To capture the effects of the news coverage, news from Reuters,
as the largest news agency worldwide, will be collected. The news collection software
Factiva is used to search all Reuters news using the search term "Bitcoin". For measuring
the impact of news flows, a news frequency time series is generated, which contains the
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daily number of collected news. Also, a news dummy time series is generated, in order
to capture the effect of mere news presence. If there is any news per day, the dummy will
take a value of one, otherwise zero. Unlike the event dummies, both the news dummy
and the news frequency variable are not divided into positive and negative categories, as
it is difficult to clearly determine the mood of the daily news, given that there are usually
several news articles per day which may have different views on Bitcoin-related topics.
An attempt in this direction has beenmade by Polasik et al. (2015), who extract the tone of
relevant news using a keyword-based approach and find that the Bitcoin’ return increases
(respectively, decreases) with positive (respectively, negative) news. In any case, it can
be assumed that media attention will cause Bitcoin’s exchange rate to move regardless of
direction. Therefore, it seems more appropriate to focus on the role of news coverage in
driving Bitcoin’s exchange rate volatility rather than its exchange rate level.
4 Model design and empirical results
The paper by Engle (1982) was a major inspiration for research focusing on finan-
cial time series. Since then, a rich body of literature on the design of heteroscedastic
financial time series has been developed. Engle (1982) introduced the Autoregressive
Conditional Heteroscedasticity model (ARCH) which is capable of describing the volatil-
ity clustering of financial time series in the short and medium run. However, to capture
the nature of volatility, ARCH models often require a large number of lags. In order to
address this issue, Bollerslev (1986) introduced the generalised Autoregressive Condi-
tional Heteroscedasticity model (GARCH) which adds an autoregressive component to
the conditional variance equation of the ARCH model and greatly enhances information
implicitly contained in the conditional variance. Especially high-frequency exchange rate
dynamics seem to be well captured by GARCH models.
Since the exchange rate seems to have structural breaks, conventional unit root tests
are likely to be biased. Hence, we use a unit root test developed by Perron (1997), which
considers one endogenously determined structural break in the intercept. For the log
value of the exchange rate, the test statistic is -3.42 with a break on 14 January 2013, while
the critical value for rejecting the null hypothesis (the series has a unit root and is there-
fore non-stationary) is -4.82 at 10%. For the daily return of the exchange rate yt =
Pt−Pt−1
Pt−1 ,
the test statistic is -15.47 with a break on 07 June 2011, while the critical value remains
the same. A unit root developed by Lumsdaine and Papell (1997) with two structural
breaks on 02 November 2013 and 04 December 2013 produces results similar to the pre-
vious ones.5 These results support using first differencing owing to stationarity. An
ARCH(1) test proposed by Engle (1982) (227.75, p-value = 0.00) points to the presence
5The detailed results are available upon request.
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of heteroscedasticity in the return series which justifies the application of GARCH-type
models. The framework used for the model selection has the general form
yt = µ+ φyt−1 + εt,
εt = σtzt, zt ∼ i.i.d.(0, 1),
(1)
where yt is the daily return of Bitcoin’s exchange rate, µ is the mean intercept. φ is the
first-order autoregressive parameter. εt is the residual dependent on the standardised
residual zt is a strong white noise process i.i.d.(0,1) and the conditional volatility σt,
which can be formed by a wide range of GARCH-type models, as described in Table
2.6 For choosing the optimal GARCH-type model, the approach of Katsiampa (2017) is
followed which takes the log-likelihood value, information criteria, and diagnostic tests
into account. However, two aspects in the selection process differ from that of Katsiampa
(2017). First, Katsiampa (2017) relies exclusively upon GARCH(1,1)-type models in the
selection process, leaving an open question mark on whether higher-order GARCH-type
models are better suited to capture Bitcoin’s volatility. Although GARCH (1,1)-type mod-
els are standard candidate models in the relevant literature, as they are often sufficient
to capture and forecast the volatility of many financial returns, their use may result in
significant underfitting given the exceptionally high volatility of Bitcoin. Against this
backdrop, it may be more appropriate to use higher-order GARCH models to capture
volatility persistence and fat tail behaviour more satisfactorily. Therefore, the selection of
the lag order is of critical importance, and lags up to (5,5) will be tested in the selection
process. Second, against strong evidence of the existence of fat tails in the financial return
data, Katsiampa (2017) chooses Gaussian error distribution, which can be problematic
owing to frequently large exchange rate movements in the Bitcoin market. Regarding the
higher moments of the daily return of the Bitcoin exchange rate, the kurtosis is 15.69, and
the skewness is 0.70, indicating a leptokurtic and right-skewed distribution of the return.
A JB test (18,025, p-value = 0.00) soundly indicates that a normal distribution fails to repli-
cate the fat tails. Overall, these figures suggest that the standardised residuals likely have
a fat-tailed distribution. Therefore, the skewed Generalised Error Distribution (GED) is
chosen to capture the leptokurtosis and skewness of the standardised residuals.
The information criterion used is the Akaike information criterion (AIC), and the
diagnostic tests include ARCH(1), Ljung-Box(15), and Jarque-Bera (JB) tests, which test
squared standardised residuals for heteroscedasticity, squared standardised residuals for
autocorrelation, and standardised residuals for normality, respectively.7 The estimation
results of the GARCH-type models in Table 3 indicate two potential optimal models.
6Details of these GARCH-type models can be found in Ghalanos (2018).
7The Bayesian information criterion (BIC) is not considered because it penalizes model complexity more
severely than AIC and therefore often refers to GARCH(1,1)-type models, which is unlikely to capture
the high volatility level of Bitcoin. Although AIC is known to be at risk of overestimating the number
of parameters, overfitting appears to be less problematic than underfitting given Bitcoin’s high volatility.
The Hannan-Quinn information criterion(HQC) points to the same lag orders as AIC and is therefore not
presented as well.
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Table 2:Description of the GARCH-type models used for model selection
GARCH σ2t = ω +
∑p
i=1 αiε
2
t−i +
∑q
j=1 βjσ
2
t−j
EGARCH lnσ2t = ω +
∑p
i=1 αi [|zt−i| − E(|zt−i|)] + γizt−i +
∑q
j=1 βj ln(σ
2
t−j)
TGARCH σt = ω +
∑p
i=1 αiσt−i(|zt−i| − γizt−i) +
∑q
j=1 βjσt−j , γi ≤ 1
GJR-GARCH σ2t = ω +
∑p
i=1 αiε
2
t−i + γiε
2
t−iIt−i +
∑q
j=1 βjσ
2
t−j , It−i =
{
1, εt−i ≤ 0
0, εt−i > 0
NGARCH σλt = ω +
∑p
i=1 αiε
λ
t−i +
∑q
j=1 βjσ
λ
t−j
NAGARCH σ2t = ω +
∑p
i=1 αiσ
2
t−i(zt−i − ηi)2 +
∑q
j=1 βjσ
2
t−j
AVGARCH σt = ω +
∑p
i=1 αiσt−i(|zt−i − η2i| − η1i(zt−i − η2i)) +
∑q
j=1 βjσt−j , |η1i| ≤ 1
APARCH σλt = ω +
∑p
i=1 αiσ
λ
t−i(|zt−i| − γizt−i)λ +
∑q
j=1 βjσ
λ
t−j , γi ≤ 1
CGARCH σ2t = qt +
∑p
i=1 α(ε
2
t−i − qt−i) +
∑q
j=1 βj(σ
2
t−j − qt−j),
qt = ω + ρqt−1 + θ(ε2t−1 − σ2t−1)
FIGARCH σ2t =
(
ω − ε¯2t−i
)
+
∑p
i=1 αi
(
ε2t−i + ε¯
2
t−i
)
+
∑q
j=1 βj
(
σ2t−j − ε2t−j
)
,
ε¯2t−j = ε
2
t−j +
(∑∞
k=1 pikL
k
)
ε2t−j , pik =
∏
1≤i≤k
i−1−δ
i
Notes: EGARCH is the abbreviation for the Exponential GARCH model, TGARCH for the Threshold GARCH model, GJR-GARCH for
the Glosten-Jagannathan-Runkle GARCHmodel, NGARCH for the Nonlinear GARCHmodel, NAGARCH for the Nonlinear Asymmetric
GARCHmodel, AVGARCH for the Absolute Value GARCHmodel, APARCH for the Asymmetric Power ARCHmodel, CGARCH for the
Component GARCH model, IGARCH for the Integrated GARCH model, and FIGARCH for the Fractionally Integrated GARCH model.
While AIC points to the EGARCH(3,3) model, the JB test statistic in the CGARCH(1,2)
model has fallen the most compared to those in other models, suggesting its superior
ability in explaining Bitcoin’s volatility. However, there are two issues when using the
CGARCH(1,2) model in this paper. First, the CGARCH model class divides the condi-
tional variance into a transitory and a permanent component to investigate the short and
long-runmovements of the volatility, making it difficult to precisely position the explana-
tory variables, and thus to examine the driving forces of the volatility. Second, the signif-
icantly lower value of the JB test of the CGARCH(1,2) model compared to those of other
GARCH-type models indicates that the permanent component of the conditional vari-
ance, which is a time-varying following AR(1)-type process, already captures the driving
forces of the volatility well without the inclusion of explanatory variables. The addition
of explanatory variables is therefore likely to produce insignificant results. For these rea-
sons, the EGARCH(3,3) model is eventually chosen. The results of the diagnostic tests
show that ARCH effects have been well captured by the EGARCH(3,3) model, suggest-
ing that this EGARCH specification appears to adequately describe the volatility of the
daily return of Bitcoin’s exchange rate.
In the next step, the explanatory variables enter the EGARCH(3,3) model. The em-
pirical methodology employed is closely related to the study by Funke et al. (2015). The
mean and conditional variance equations take the following form for the daily return of
Bitcoin’s exchange rate yt and the associated volatility σt:
yt = µ+
Nˆ∑
j=0
κj vˆt−j + φyt−1 + εt, εt = σt · zt
lnσ2t = ω +
N˜∑
l=0
ψlv˜t−l +
3∑
i=1
(
αi(|zt−i| − E(|zt−i|) + γizt−i
)
+
3∑
j=1
βj lnσ
2
t−j
(2)
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Table 3: Estimation of the GARCH-type models
GARCH EGARCH TGARCH GJR-GARCH NGARCH NAGARCH AVGARCH APARCH CGARCH FIGARCH
Preferred (p,q) (1,1) (3,3) (1,2) (2,1) (1,2) (1,2) (1,2) (1,2) (1,2) (1,1)
Mean equation
Constant µ 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(17.37) (9.95) (39.23) (39.38) (29.43) (46.13) (37.68) (52.59) (3.45) (37.63)
AR(1) φ1 -0.012*** -0.010*** -0.019*** -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.013*** -0.017***
(-11.57) (-5.55) (-30.29) (-27.16) (-23.94) (-20.55) (-23.83) (-19.74) (-3.59) (-13.32)
Variance equation
Constant ω 0.001** -0.048*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001* 0.001*** 0.001**
(2.46) (-19.17) (4.68) (2.64) (3.71) (2.37) (4.63) (1.71) (3.03) (2.48)
ARCH α1 0.197*** 0.474*** 0.282*** 0.182*** 0.302*** 0.257*** 0.284*** 0.301*** 0.171*** 0.210***
(8.77) (10,414.98) (11.32) (8.98) (9.47) (9.08) (12.61) (9.11) (3.56) (4.07)
ARCH α2 0.031*** 0.001
(547.68) (0.01)
ARCH α3 -0.407***
(-11,493.27)
GARCH β1 0.802*** 0.763*** 0.485*** 0.833*** 0.464*** 0.390*** 0.461*** 0.457*** 0.389*** 0.718***
(31.34) (13,261.93) (32.36) (39.54) (15.03) (9.18) (32.32) (16.36) (12.20) (7.39)
GARCH β2 0.994*** 0.296*** 0.306*** 0.351*** 0.318*** 0.313*** 0.391***
(23,061.14) (17.70) (10.29) (8.87) (23.04) (12.11) (11.90)
GARCH β3 -0.764***
(-31,372.34)
EGARCH γ1 -0.030***
(-1,214.50)
EGARCH γ2 0.002***
(3.23)
EGARCH γ3 0.056***
(1,952.39)
TGARCH γ -0.022
(-0.51)
GJR-GARCH γ1 0.162***
(3.48)
GJR-GARCH γ2 -0.194***
(-4.67)
NGARCH λ 1.247***
(16.22)
NAGARCH η1 -0.068
(-0.68)
AVGARCH η11 0.052
(1.50)
AVGARCH η21 -0.101***
(-8.08)
APARCH λ 1.252***
(8.92)
APARCH γ1 -0.022
(-0.43)
CGARCH ρ 0.999***
(60,904.74)
CGARCH θ 0.088***
(8.54)
FIGARCH δ 0.787***
(6.46)
Diagnostic tests
LogL 5,094.88 5,123.90 5,106.47 5,101.63 5,107.34 5,099.10 5,106.82 5,107.46 5,101.93 5,102.05
AIC -3.83616 -3.85072 -3.84135 -3.83695 -3.84201 -3.83580 -3.84086 -3.84134 -3.83717 -3.83877
ARCH(1) 0.93 0.01 1.26 0.01 0.34 0.11 0.79 0.41 0.01 0.03
(0.34) (0.91) (0.26) (0.93) (0.56) (0.74) (0.38) (0.52) -(0.98) (0.87)
LB(15) 8.21 3.29 6.43 5.54 5.98 7.00 5.85 6.13 7.11 6.48
(0.92) (1.00) (0.97) (0.99) (0.98) (0.96) (0.98) (0.98) (0.95) (0.97)
JB 11,026*** 12,303*** 13,707*** 13,202*** 13,657*** 11,292*** 14,207*** 13,746*** 7,881*** 9,263***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Notes: Sample from 16 March 2011 – 21 June 2018. ***, **, * indicator significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. For the parameters t-values robust to
heteroscedasticity are given in parentheses. For the residual tests prob-values are given in parentheses. LB(15) is the Ljung-Box Q-statistic for 15 lags. ARCH(1)
is the LM-test for 1st order ARCH effects. JB ist the Jarque-Bera test for normality. Diagnostic tests are carried out on the standardised residuals. The models are
estimated in R, using the package rugarch and the nonlinear solver algorithm SOLNP.
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On the mean equation side, µ is the mean intercept. φ is the AR(1) parameter. εt is
the residual dependent on the conditional volatility σt and the standardised residual zt
following a skewed GED distribution. κj are the parameters of the explanatory variables
vector vˆ = {vˆt−Nˆ , . . . , vˆt}. In the conditional variance equation, ω is the variance inter-
cept. The ARCH parameter α determines the size effect of the standardised residuals on
volatility which captures the general impact of a shock on the volatility. The GARCH
parameter β captures the persistence of the volatility. The leverage parameter γ captures
the sign effect of the standardised residuals on the volatility, i.e., negative γ implies that
negative shocks have a greater impact on the volatility than positive shocks. ψl are the
parameters of the exogenous variables vector v˜ = {v˜t−N˜ , . . . , v˜t}.
The fundamental variables in the mean equation are the percentage change in the
hash rate (HR) and the logarithm of Amihud’s measure of illiquidity (AMI). Since an
increasing hash rate means more aggregated computation power, mining is considered
to be an indicator of investment activities in the Bitcoin market and competition among
the miners. As such, a higher hash rate points to intensified competition and could create
constant downward pressure on the exchange rate, as miners are likely to be forced to sell
some Bitcoins in order to invest in more computing power and thus to keep pace with the
competition. Therefore, HR is expected to have a negative sign.8 In a speculative market,
when many investors buy an illiquid asset such as Bitcoin, the price can increase rapidly.
Consequently, it is expected that lower liquidity translates to higher returns. Therefore,
AMI is expected to carry a positive sign.
On the dummy variables side, the positive/negative event dummies for regulatory
events D+/-REGT, monetary policy events D
+/-
MP, and Bitcoin-specific events D
+/-
SE enter the
mean equation. Regarding the positive events, it is expected that (i) a positive regula-
tory event encourages market participants to buy Bitcoin in the expectation of a higher
probability that Bitcoin will become mainstream in the future and thus its demand and
exchange rate will increase, leading to a higher exchange rate today; (ii) a positive mon-
etary policy event signals a prolonged period of low interest rates, leading to an increase
in Bitcoin’s exchange rate against the background that all asset prices tend to rise when
monetary policy is loose; (iii) a positive Bitcoin-specific event boosts the overall market
sentiment, leading to higher demand for Bitcoin. Therefore, the dummies D+REGT, D
+
MP,
and D+SE are expected to carry a positive sign. The expectations of the negative events on
Bitcoin’s exchange rate are vice versa and therefore not further explained. Hence, D-REGT,
D-MP, and D
-
SE are expected to carry a negative sign.
To test Bitcoin’s hedge capability against global uncertainty and market risks, the
logarithm of GVIX and of EPU, as well as the percentage change of the price of gold and
of the stock market indices S&P Global 1200, MSCI World, and MSCI EM are included
in the conditional mean equation, denoted as ln(GVIX), ln(EPU),∆%Gold,∆%SPG 1200,
8Wang and Liu (2015) have shown that the average time lag between getting a Bitcoin from mining and
selling it dropped from 19 days in 2011 to around 1.5 days in 2013. Accordingly, it is reasonable to assume
that mining and selling now occur within one day and hence, HR is included with no time lag.
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∆%MSCI World, and ∆%MSCI EM respectively. As a proxy for global financial mar-
ket uncertainty, an increase in GVIX is expected to lead to an increase in the exchange
rate in the Bitcoin market, assuming Bitcoin can serve as a hedge instrument. It can also
be expected that increasing economic policy uncertainty proxied by EPU raises the ex-
change rate of Bitcoin. The literature suggests that gold serves as a hedge against a falling
stock market, so this should logically also apply to Bitcoin as a potential hedge, and the
relationship between Bitcoin and gold is expected to be positive. Therefore, ln(GVIX),
ln(EPU), and∆%Gold are expected to have a positive sign, while∆%SPG 1200,∆%MSCI
World, and∆%MSCI EM are expected to carry a negative sign. With regard to safe haven
capabilities, a potential non-linear relationship between the Bitcoin market and global
uncertainty is examined, i.e., whether Bitcoin’s hedge capability holds with increasing
uncertainty, since Bitcoin as a volatile asset may be subject to flight-to-quality in times
of market turbulence. Consequently, the quadratic terms of ln(GVIX) and ln(EPU) are
included in the conditional mean equation, denoted as (ln(GVIX))2 and (ln(EPU))2. The
outcome is uncertain. One possible scenario is that Bitcoin can serve as a safe haven in
times of market distress, leading to a positive impact of (ln(GVIX))2 and (ln(EPU))2. The
other option is that Bitcoin moves with the markets when the global uncertainty is high,
as indicated by a negative impact of (ln(GVIX))2 and (ln(EPU))2.
The fundamental variables in the conditional variance equation are the logarithm
of trading volume in BTC (TVOL), the percentage change in the number of transactions
(NOTX) and the logarithm of the revenue of miners in BTC (MREV). A key feature in the
foreign exchange market microstructure literature is the relationship between exchange
rate volatility and trading volume. It is a stylized fact that this relationship is positive,
and the so-called mixture of distribution hypothesis first proposed by Clark (1973) ar-
gues that volatility and trade volume are positively correlated because both are positively
linked to information arrival, as suggested by several empirical studies such as Tauchen
and Pitts (1983), Karpoff (1987), and Gallant et al. (1992). Hence the trading volume vari-
able TVOL is expected to carry a positive sign. Results from more recent literature, such
as Easley and O’hara (1992), Jones et al. (1994), Jones and Seguin (1997), and Ané and
Geman (2000) argue that transaction frequency counts more than volume in explaining
volatility. Therefore, the variable NOTX is expected to carry a positive sign as well. Rev-
enue of the miners is virtually equal to the Bitcoin supply growth per day. Despite the
fixed supply design, the growth fluctuates in practice nearly 11% on average.9 Since it is
expected that miners sell some of the mined Bitcoins, an increase in total revenue posi-
tively influences the supply. In a speculative market, the reaction of demand to a higher
supply is unpredictable, higher revenue of the miners does not necessarily lead to a de-
cline in exchange rates, but might as well results in a surge. Hence, a positive effect on
the volatility is expected, and MREV is added in the conditional variance equation.
Moreover, the conditional variance equation contains the number of Reuters news
9Source: https://blockchain.info; author’s calculation.
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per day (NFRQ) as well as the Reuters news presence dummy (DNEWS). Works such as
Goodhart et al. (1993) and Andersen et al. (2007) show that the mere presence of an an-
nouncement drives the volatility. Therefore, we expect a positive link between NEWS
and volatility. Although the mixture of distribution hypothesis emphasises the role of
public information arrival in driving trading volume and volatility, papers investigating
the relationship between the number of news released by major newswires and volatil-
ity in financial markets find little explanatory power of the number of news collected by
Reuters (Berry and Howe, 1994) or Dow Jones (Mitchell andMulherin, 1994) with respect
to volatility. In that light, the effect of the variable NEWS on volatility is uncertain.
Lastly, including dummy variables into GARCHmodels bears severe risks in the es-
timation. Doornik and Ooms (2008) show that GARCH models with dummy variables
in the mean equation may cause multimodal likelihood. Since reaching a global maxi-
mum of the log-likelihood function is mandatory, the EGARCH parameter estimations
are looped with 100 different random initial parameters to ensure finding the most likely
parameters. Also, to avoid further possibilities of multimodality, the solution proposed
by Doornik and Ooms (2008) by adding the corresponding dummy variable with one lag
in the conditional variance equation is applied as a robustness check.
Coming to the empirical results, the estimations of the EGARCH(3,3) models, includ-
ing fundamental variables and related event dummies, are presented in Table 4. Further
estimations including Bitcoin news coverage, global uncertainty and financial market
variables are shown in Table 5. Regarding the diagnostic tests, first, the squared stan-
dardised residuals are not autocorrelated owing to the insignificant results of the ARCH
test and the Ljung-Box test, suggesting that the volatility clustering behaviour is well cap-
tured by the EGARCH(3,3) model. Second, designed for detecting any neglected asym-
metry in the conditional variance, the sign bias, the size bias, and the joint effect tests are
all insignificant, implying that the asymmetry in volatility is well captured. Third, the
non-explanatory coefficients are significant at the 1% level except for the AR(1) parame-
ter φ. Taken together, these results support the choice of the EGARCH(3,3) specification.
In Table 4, we first consider Model I which is the EGARCH(3,3) model estimation
without explanatory variables. The insignificant mean AR(1) coefficient (φ = -0.010) sug-
gest that there is little exchange rate level memory, implying an uneven evolution of the
Bitcoin exchange rate over time. The first ARCH coefficient (γ1 = 0.473) implies that
the volatility is highly sensitive to market events in the sample period. The GARCH
parameter estimates (β1 = 0.763, β2 = 0.995, and β3 = -0.765) suggests highly persis-
tent conditional volatility over time, as the half-life of a volatility shock ln 0.5ln(β1+β1+β1) is
ln 0.5
ln(0.763+0.995−0.765) = 98.67 days, i.e., it takes the conditional variance about three months
to return to half of its initial level. The first leverage coefficient (γ1 = -0.031) suggests the
presence of leverage effect, as for a standardised shock with magnitude one, the ratio be-
tween negative and positive standardised shocks is σ
2
t (zt−1=−1)
σ2t (zt−1=1)
= exp(−0.031×−1)exp(−0.031×1) = 1.063,
i.e., the impact of a standardised negative shock of size one is about 6% stronger than
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Table 4: EGARCH(3,3) model estimates including fundamental and event variables
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII) (IX)
Mean equation
µ 0.002*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.002*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.010***
(10.12) (20.14) (28.36) (62.30) (8.70) (23.28) (28.26) (32.22) (38.90)
φ -0.010 -0.012 -0.011** -0.013*** -0.013 0.001 -0.012*** -0.010 -0.00035
(-0.092) (-0.49) (-2.34) (-7.45) (-0.64) (-0.77) (-4.90) (-0.23) (-0.87)
Fundamental variables
AMI 0.00051*** 0.00046*** 0.00053*** 0.00044*** 0.00041*** 0.00042*** 0.00040***
(10.25) (18.72) (50.74) (5.71) (31.78) (24.20) (38.81)
HR 0.00002 0.00003*** 0.00002*** 0.00003 0.00001 0.00002*** 0.00002 0.00002***
(1.28) (10.20) (6.33) (0.96) (0.53) (5.78) (1.44) (44.58)
Positive event variables
D+REGT 0.008*** 0.008***
(16.47) (30.75)
D+MP 0.002*** 0.00021***
(12.32) (23.75)
D+SE 0.007*** 0.005***
(7.75) (35.78)
Negative event variables
D-REGT -0.033*** -0.033***
(-72.32) (-61.89)
D-MP 0.00028*** 0.00028***
(20.59) (7.82)
D-SE -0.039*** -0.038***
(-48.05) (-52.42)
Variance equation
ω -0.050*** -5.709*** -5.696*** -5.540*** -5.652*** -6.544*** -5.616*** -4.976*** -5.493***
(-10.74) (-42.76) (-16.93) (-105.24) (-5.67) (-9.96) (-34.30) (-15.13) (-61.73)
α1 0.473*** 0.500 0.494*** 0.503*** 0.495*** 0.510*** 0.492*** 0.484*** 0.511***
(5,515.15) (1.38) (7.69) (20.54) (2.87) (8.70) (10.33) (10.83) (13.66)
α2 0.032*** 0.746** 0.750*** 0.748*** 0.748*** 0.761 0.746*** 0.732*** 0.753***
(1,626.12) (2.49) (6.12) (33.69) (2.58) (1.14) (8.73) (11.40) (13.71)
α3 -0.406*** 0.405*** 0.407*** 0.403*** 0.406*** 0.420*** 0.405*** 0.391*** 0.399***
(-5,270.13) (4.99) (5.75) (21.61) (2.35) (7.28) (7.89) (9.66) (12.12)
β1 0.763*** -0.629 -0.641*** -0.633*** -0.643 -0.610 -0.643*** -0.672*** -0.647***
(4,215.52) (-29.66) (-42.72) (-90.89) (-17.36) (-14.62) (-57.10) (-23.56) (-50.23)
β2 0.995*** 0.598 0.601*** 0.603*** 0.601 0.573 0.603*** 0.627*** 0.613***
(15,323.76) (68.23) (33.21) (88.01) (15.63) (14.96) (48.04) (33.83) (47.75)
β3 -0.765*** 0.736 0.746*** 0.741*** 0.747 0.709 0.749*** 0.785*** 0.755***
(-4,574.62) (20.83) (33.21) (92.23) (26.24) (16.74) (79.78) (31.08) (59.02)
γ1 -0.031*** 0.500 -0.003 0.003 -0.004 -0.016 -0.005 -0.005 -0.001
(-868.08) (0.01) (-0.01) (1.44) (-0.06) (-0.45) (-0.20) (-0.07) (-0.34)
γ2 0.002*** 0.746 0.012 0.017*** 0.012 -0.011 0.011 0.014 0.006
(2.70) (0.06) (0.10) (3.34) (0.15) (-0.24) (1.04) (0.28) (0.27)
γ3 0.055*** 0.405 0.020 0.023*** 0.021 0.002 0.022* 0.027 0.015
(1,032.80) (0.04) (0.69) (3.52) (0.21) (0.05) (1.71) (1.34) (0.91)
Fundamental variables
NOTX 0.278*** 0.270*** 0.273*** 0.269*** 0.300*** 0.266*** 0.228*** 0.251***
(25.62) (17.36) (84.77) (23.71) (8.70) (46.20) (4.70) (41.62)
TVOL 0.001 0.001 0.001*** 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.06) (0.61) (3.65) (1.34) (1.14) (1.44) (0.68) (0.97)
MREV 0.110** 0.118*** 0.101*** 0.113*** 0.155*** 0.116*** 0.110*** 0.128***
(2.03) (7.58) (24.78) (3.00) (7.28) (13.64) (3.16) (21.84)
Diagnostic tests
LogL 5,123.97 5,140.35 5142.17 5140.37 5,41.04 5,139.38 5,140.36 5147.12 5156.38
ARCH(1) 0.01 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.01 0.02
(0.91) (0.72) (0.73) (0.74) (0.73) (0.73) (0.74) (0.94) (0.90)
LB(15) 3.34 6.53 6.55 6.36 6.48 6.84 6.45 7.91 7.39
(0.99) (0.97) (0.97) (0.97) (0.97) (0.96) (0.97) (0.92) (0.95)
JB 12,428*** 10,788*** 10,529*** 11,068*** 10,722*** 8,083*** 10.622*** 7,743*** 6,919***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Skewness -0.86 -0.42 -0.40 -0.44 -0.41 -0.20 -0.41 -0.25 -0.15
Kurtosis 13.48 9.83 12.72 9.96 12.81 11.54 12.77 11.35 7.90
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Table 4 Cont.: EGARCH(1,1) model estimates including fundamental and event variables
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII) (IX)
Negative sign bias test 0.30 0.54 0.43 0.55 0.45 0.23 0.43 0.35 0.05
(0.77) (0.59) (0.67) (0.59) (0.65) (0.82) (0.66) (0.72) (0.96)
Poistive sign bias test 0.92 0.93 0.97 0.90 0.94 1.12 0.95 0.81 1.21
(0.36) (0.35) (0.33) (0.37) (0.35) (0.26) (0.34) (0.42) (0.23)
Joint effect test 0.96 2.09 1.67 2.21 1.70 1.31 1.66 1.36 1.48
(0.81) (0.55) (0.64) (0.53) (0.64) (0.73) (0.65) (0.72) (0.69)
Notes: Sample from 16 March 2011 – 21 June 2018. ***, **, * indicator significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. For the parameters t-values robust to
heteroscedasticity are given in parentheses. For the residual tests prob-values are given in parentheses. LB(15) is the Ljung-Box Q-statistic for 15 lags. ARCH(1)
is the LM-test for 1st order ARCH effects. JB ist the Jarque-Bera test for normality. The sign bias test examines the asymmetric impact of positive and negative
shocks upon the conditional variance. The positive and negative size bias tests examine whether the magnitude of positive respectively negative shocks affects the
conditional variance. The joint effect test examines the simultaneous presence of sign and size bias. Diagnostic tests are carried out on the standardized residuals.
The models are estimated in R, using the package rugarch and the nonlinear solver algorithm SOLNP.
that of a standardised positive shock of the same size. The leverage effect gets more
pronounced with stronger standardised shocks, as the impact of a standardised nega-
tive shock of size five is about 36% stronger than its positive counterpart, leading to the
conclusion that Bitcoin’s exchange rate volatility is affected more effectively by nega-
tive shocks, contradicting the findings of symmetric response of Bitcoin’s exchange rate
volatility to shocks found by Dyhrberg (2016a). In fact, these findings are consistent with
those of Bouoiyour and Selmi (2015a), which argues that Bitcoin is likely to be driven by
negative rather than positive shocks. Lastly, while the magnitude of skewness (= -0.86)
has not declined, the kurtosis (= 13.48) and JB test (= 12,428) of standardised residuals
compared to those of daily return of Bitcoin suggest that a fraction of fat tails have been
captured by the specification. At the same time, these values also indicate that the fat
tails regarding the standardised residuals are still present to a high degree, underlining
the need for explanatory variables to capture the driving forces of Bitcoin’s exchange rate
dynamics.
On the fundamental side, the liquidity and trading volume variables (AMI, TVOL)
perform adequately just as expected, confirming the negative impact of liquidity on the
exchange rate level as well as the positive link between trading volume and volatility.
Notably, a 1% increase in trading volume leads to a 0.28% increase in the conditional
variance, supporting the role of market microstructure in explaining Bitcoin’s volatility.
As the trading volume in the Bitcoin markets is dominated by speculation, the results
also suggest that Bitcoin’s volatile movement is driven by speculative forces, consistent
with the findings of MacDonell (2014). The insignificant coefficient of the variable NOTX,
however, does not suggest trading frequency drives the volatility, which seems to con-
trast the findings of Koutmos (2018), stating that transaction activities are linked with
changes in Bitcoin’s exchange rate. When excluding TVOL from Model II, NOTX be-
comes significant, providing some evidence that trading activity is dominated by volume
rather than frequency.10 Consequently, the results may suggest that single large trades
are rather responsible for Bitcoin’s volatile movements than the sheer number of trading
transactions, underlining the lack of transparency of the Bitcoin market where individual
10The results are available upon request.
21
wealthy traders can manipulate Bitcoin’s exchange rate at the expense of others.
However, in contraction to the expectation, the coefficient of the competition indica-
tor variable (HR) is slightly positive throughout the models in Table 4, indicating that the
hash rate has some positive influence on the exchange rate. One possible explanation is
provided by Kristoufek (2015), who argues that increasing competition, as proxied by the
hash rate, combined with rising costs for hardware and electricity, will drive more miners
out of the market. As an alternative to mining, they can invest directly in Bitcoin, result-
ing in higher demand and a higher exchange rate. The parameter estimate for the Bitcoin
supply variable (MREV) indicates that a 1% increase in Bitcoin’s supply leads to a 0.11%
increase in the conditional variance, suggesting that a higher supply translates to higher
volatility in the Bitcoin market. Lastly, as the half-life of a volatility shock decreases from
98.67 to ln 0.5ln(β1+β1+β1) =
ln 0.5
ln(−0.629+0.598−0.736) = 1.98 days and the leverage coefficients γ1,
γ2, and γ3 become insignificant upon the entry of the market fundamental variables, the
results suggest that Bitcoin’s exchange rate volatile movements are primary driven by
fundamentals.
The performance of the related event dummies in Table 4 matches its expectations
except for one case. In Model VI, the liquidity variable AMI is dropped due to correlation
issue with the dummy D-REGT. Turning to the positive events, the results confirm that
positive regulation-related, monetary policy, and Bitcoin-related specific events lead to
increasing exchange rate of Bitcoin. While a positive regulation-related event and Bitcoin-
related specific event lead to an increase in Bitcoin’s exchange rate by 0.8% and 0.7%, the
impact of the positive monetary policy events is considerably weaker. Regarding the
negative events, the results show that a negative regulation-related event and a Bitcoin-
related specific event lead to a decrease in Bitcoin’s exchange rate by 3.3% and 3.9%,
respectively. The considerable decline in the skewness (= -0.20 respectively -0.25) and
the JB test statistics (= 8,083 respectively 7,743) of the standardised residuals in Model VI
and VIII compared to previous specifications shows that negative regulation-related and
Bitcoin-related specific events are among the main drivers of Bitcoin’s volatile movement
to date. Surprisingly, negative monetary policy events appear to have a positive impact
on the exchange rate, albeit the effect is minimal. One possible explanation could be that
tapering announcements contained in the negative monetary policy event set might be
responsible for inflating asset prices, thereby potentially offsetting the negative impact of
the other negative monetary policy events on Bitcoin’s exchange rate.11 Lastly, Model IX
shows that the results are robust when the variables simultaneously enter the regression.
To summarise the results of Table 4, the estimated parameters of the explanatory
variables support the findings of previous literature emphasising the role of fundamen-
tals in explaining the volatile dynamics of Bitcoin. Notably, negative regulation-related
and Bitcoin-related specific events have a critical impact on the exchange rate level, as do,
to a lesser extent, their positive counterparts, while expansionarymonetary policy world-
11Tapering is the unwinding of the asset purchase volume regarding a quantitative easing program.
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wide events have a limited, albeit significant, positive impact on Bitcoin’s exchange rate.
In Table 5, the Bitcoin news coverage, global uncertainty and financial market vari-
ables enter the models. As financial markets are only open during the workdays, the
missing values on weekends and holidays of ∆%Gold, ln(GVIX), ln(EPU), ∆%SPG1200,
∆%MSCI World, and ∆%MSCI EM are imputed using the approach Multivariate Impu-
tation by Chained Equations (MICE), as developed by Buuren and Groothuis-Oudshoorn
(2010). Pioneered by the theory in Rubin (1987), multiple imputation generates imputed
values by repeatedly combining drawn values of the parameters from a joint distribution
of the observed data. The key advantage of multiple imputation over straight-forward
approaches such as deleting missing values or replacing missing values with the mean
of the observed data is that it provides more accurate estimates of the parameters and
their standard errors (Little and Rubin, 1989; Allison, 2002) while maintaining the overall
statistical power. In practice, specifying an appropriate joint distribution for large num-
bers of variables can be a difficult task. The MICE approach, in turn, draws imputed
values from univariate distributions of each variable conditional on other variables us-
ing generalised linear models for each conditional distribution to predict missing values.
However, MICE lacks the theoretical foundation regarding that the set of specified condi-
tional distributions may not correspond to any joint distribution, which indicates against
the employment of univariate distributions. Despite this major drawback, simulation-
based research shows that MICE performs well in practice.
Overall, the parameter estimates are significant andmostly in line with their expecta-
tions. Model I and II show that a Reuters news (NFRQ) increases the conditional variance
by about 3% and the presence of Reuters news (DNEWS) increases the conditional variance
averagely by about 9%. The results underline the role of news coverage in driving the
volatility of Bitcoin’s exchange rate, especially when the number of reports on Bitcoin
soars. Global uncertainty variables are sequentially regressed against the daily return of
Bitcoin in Model III-V. The variable AMI is dropped from Model IV and V due to corre-
lation issues with ln(GVIX) and ln(EPU). Gold has a positive impact on the conditional
mean, which supports Bitcoin’s hedging ability. ln(GVIX) meets its expectations and has
a positive effect on the conditional mean, providing some support for Bitcoin’s hedging
capability. However, (ln(GVIX))2 carries a negative sign, which suggests that the hedg-
ing capability diminishes with increasing global financial market uncertainty. With the
corresponding parameter estimates, differentiation of the Bitcoin return with respect to
ln(GVIX) shows that Bitcoin’s positive relationship with GVIX disappears and becomes
negative when GVIX takes a higher value than about 18. Since the GVIX has the same or-
der of magnitude as the VIX due to its construction and its median is about 17, this result
suggests that Bitcoin can be a hedge in times of calm financial markets, but moves with
the markets in times of market distress, arguing against Bitcoin’s safe haven capability.
A likely explanation is that financial distress tends to trigger flight-to-quality behaviour,
causing some investors to turn their Bitcoins into cash or safe assets.
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Table 5: EGARCH(3,3) model estimates including fundamental, event, news, uncertainty,
and financial market variables
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII) (IX) (X)
Mean equation
µ 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** -0.072*** 0.004*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.010*** -0.046*** -0.57***
(20.89) (35.15) (36.98) (-64.32) (57.91) (48.49) (53.34) (22.18) (-264.93) (-244.66)
φ 0.005* 0.001*** -0.001** 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.003** 0.002 0.003 0.008***
(1.69) (3.33) (-2.21) (3.04) (7.45) (9.15) (2.04) (0.09) (1.82) (10.81)
Fundamental variables
AMI 0.00041*** 0.00041*** 0.00041*** 0.00041*** 0.00045*** 0.00040*** 0.00045***
(22.13) (33.84) (37.22) (50.53) (53.98) (22.28) (37.07)
HR 0.00003*** 0.00003*** 0.00002*** 0.00002** 0.00001 0.00002*** 0.00002*** 0.00002*** 0.00003** 0.00003***
(4.73) (11.51) (21.14) (2.28) (0.71) (31.14) (28.13) (2.97) (2.06) (18.32)
Positive event variables
D+REGT 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.010***
(32.10) (27.94) (32.87) (9.24) (47.06) (38.55) (34.52) (5.61) (5.31) (52.98)
D+MP 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002 0.002 -0.00042 0.002***
(18.31) (5.94) (8.84) (2.94) (28.15) (52.85) (1.26) (0.96) (-0.64) (42.67)
D+SE 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.008***
(37.00) (3.28) (30.19) (26.66) (34.87) (40.94) (40.80) (1.08) (42.39) (86.68)
Negative event variables
D-REGT -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.034*** -0.034***
(-47.73) (-70.11) (-62.88) (-18.73) (-93.96) (-67.21) (-88.97) (-41.17) (-76.10) (-46.69)
D-MP 0.00021*** 0.00025*** 0.00028*** -0.00010 0.00006*** -0.00015*** 0.00005 0.00019 -0.00026 -0.001***
(3.31) (15.68) (17.76) (-1.32) (9.91) (-12.11) (1.06) (0.009) (-0.14) (-24.01)
D-SE -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.039*** -0.038*** -0.039*** -0.038*** -0.019*** -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.036***
(-55.20) (-54.87) (-6.66) (-17.63) (-35.27) (-64.58) (-64.81) (-29.99) (-60.08) (-30.14)
Uncertainty and financial markets variables
∆%Gold 0.00003*** 0.00033*** 0.00062***
(5.72) (4.80) (22.30)
ln(GVIX) 0.051*** 0.044*** 0.042***
(148.18) (794.99) (665.86)
(ln(GVIX))2 -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.007***
(-60.26) (-547.14) (-303.78)
ln(EPU) -0.001*** -0.001***
(-58.77) (31.48)
(ln(EPU))2 0.00013*** 0.00012***
(41.05) (50.58)
∆%SPG1200 -0.00027*** 0.00001 -0.00009***
(-23.95) (0.11) (7.80)
∆%MSCI World -0.00042*** -0.00018***
(-27.75) (-1.65)
∆%MSCI EM -0.00032*** 0.00009
(-3.04) (0.82)
Variance equation
ω -7.698*** -6.128*** -5.464*** -5.962*** -5.778*** -5.504*** -5.869*** -5.781*** -8.416*** -9.104***
(-26.00) (-44.62) (-61.89) (5.00) (37.79) (-63.44) (-95.12) (-6.89) (-23.54) (-126.46)
α1 0.517*** 0.507*** 0.509*** 0.511*** 0.510*** 0.512*** 0.511*** 0.508*** 0.516*** 0.520***
(6.00) (12.72) (13.53) (8.37) (13.85) (12.61) (14.48) (8.58) (11.33) (11.87)
α2 0.736*** 0.735*** 0.752*** 0.750*** 0.749*** 0.754*** 0.760*** 0.743*** 0.728*** 0.741***
(5.71) (14.49) (14.63) (8.46) (16.35) (12.85) (16.09) (7.77) (14.09) (17.25)
α3 0.422*** 0.397*** 0.399*** 0.404*** 0.402*** 0.400*** 0.405*** 0.397*** 0.431*** 0.451***
(4.92) (10.01) (11.40) (6.95) (11.89) (10.88) (11.11) (6.53) (9.71) (12.87)
β1 -0.553** -0.616*** -0.650*** -0.643*** -0.641*** -0.646*** -0.633*** -0.631*** -0.531*** -0.526***
(-47.77) (-20.28) (44.98) (-7.90) (-41.52) (-48.49) (-61.89) (-10.21) (-7.60) (-60.27)
β2 0.537*** 0.599*** 0.613*** 0.599*** 0.602*** 0.612*** 0.600*** 0.600*** 0.516*** 0.488***
(37.51) (28.45) (49.73) (5.25) (38.97) (52.13) (57.71) (14.88) (10.91) (48.75)
β3 0.657*** 0.727*** 0.757*** 0.743*** 0.746*** 0.754*** 0.735*** 0.731*** 0.633*** 0.622***
(56.96) (31.76) (51.69) (10.52) (50.87) (57.09) (70.27) (11.85) (11.49) (68.28)
γ1 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.015 -0.014 0.001 0.001 0.004 -0.004 -0.014
(-0.14) (-0.19) (-0.09) (-0.51) (-0.49) (0.54) (0.54) (0.09) (-0.13) (-0.30)
γ2 0.005 0.005 0.005 -0.012 -0.008 0.006 0.006 0.016 0.006 -0.007
(0.18) (0.17) (0.11) (-0.30) (-0.18) (0.53) (0.91) (0.14) (0.15) (-0.13)
γ3 0.011 0.014 0.014 0.003 0.008 0.015 0.011 0.020 0.011 0.001
(0.30) (0.47) (0.59) (0.11) (0.24) (0.72) (0.48) (0.17) (0.35) (0.01)
Fundamental variables
NOTX 0.314*** 0.261*** 0.249*** 0.262*** 0.258*** 0.250*** 0.272*** 0.269*** 0.346*** 0.364***
(28.44) (16.84) (35.95) (15.09) (33.43) (41.89) (43.95) (6.53) (14.39) (60.39)
TVOL 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.59) (0.95) (1.12) (1.20) (1.33) (1.16) (1.16) (0.68) (0.80)
MREV 0.248*** 0.180*** 0.127*** 0.154*** 0.141*** 0.130*** 0.132*** 0.123*** 0.276*** 0.307***
(9.87) (11.12) (14.83) (3.24) (20.60) (18.58) (21.51) (2.62) (13.97) (37.32)
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Table 5 Cont.: EGARCH(3,3) model estimates including fundamental, event, news, uncer-
tainty, and financial market variables
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII) (IX) (X)
News variables
NFRQ 0.029*** 0.032*** 0.035***
(2.58) (4.33) (6.89)
DNEWS 0.090* 0.019
(1.70) (0.58)
Diagnostic tests
LogL 5162.53 5157.42 5,156.43 5,152.19 5,149.78 5,156.76 5,155.49 5,156.39 5.167.86 5,160.74
ARCH(1) 0.10 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.09 0.12
(0.76) (0.90) (0.91) (0.85) (0.91) (0.91) (0.78) (0.91) (0.77) (0.72)
LB(15) 9.84 7.81 7.33 7.49 7.61 7.37 8.03 7.24 10.68 13.47
(0.83) (0.93) (0.95) (0.94) (0.93) (0.95) (0.92) (0.95) (0.77) (0.57)
JB 5,753*** 5,927*** 6,842*** 6,641*** 6,353*** 6,777*** 8,099*** 6,568*** 5,361.64*** 4,868***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Skewness -0.02 -0.11 -0.15 -0.05 -0.06 -0.15 -0.27 -0.14 -0.01 0.06
Kurtosis 10.21 7.31 10.86 7.74 7.57 10.82 11.54 7.69 9.96 6.63
Negative sign bias test 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.40 0.12
(0.93) (0.93) (0.91) (0.95) (0.93) (0.97) (0.95) (0.99) (0.69) (0.90)
Poistive sign bias test 1.12 1.21 1.03 1.21 1.07 1.18 1.22 1.07 0.82 1.14
(0.26) (0.23) (0.30) (0.23) (0.29) (0.24) (0.22) (0.29) (0.41) (0.25)
Joint effect test 1.28 1.51 1.10 1.64 1.17 1.41 1.50 1.17 1.09 1.43
(0.73) (0.68) (0.78) (0.65) (0.76) (0.70) (0.68) (0.76) (0.78) (0.70)
Notes: Sample from 16 March 2011 – 21 June 2018. ***, **, * indicator significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. For the parameters t-values robust to
heteroscedasticity are given in parentheses. For the residual tests prob-values are given in parentheses. LB(15) is the Ljung-Box Q-statistic for 15 lags. ARCH(1)
is the LM-test for 1st order ARCH effects. JB ist the Jarque-Bera test for normality. The sign bias test examines the asymmetric impact of positive and negative
shocks upon the conditional variance. The positive and negative size bias tests examine whether the magnitude of positive respectively negative shocks affects the
conditional variance. The joint effect test examines the simultaneous presence of sign and size bias. Diagnostic tests are carried out on the standardized residuals.
The models are estimated in R, using the package rugarch and the nonlinear solver algorithm SOLNP.
The opposite phenomenon can be observed in the performance of ln(EPU) and
(ln(EPU))2. While ln(EPU) exerts a negative force on the Bitcoin’s exchange rate, the im-
pact of (ln(EPU))2 is positive. Differentiation of Bitcoin’s return with respect to ln(EPU)
shows that Bitcoin’s negative relationship to the EPU becomes positive if the EPU as-
sumes a value higher than about 83. Since the median of the EPU is around 85, this
result suggests that while Bitcoin tends to move with the markets when the uncertainty
of economic policy is low, a higher degree of uncertainty in economic policy will cause
some investors to buy Bitcoin, pulling up the exchange rate and thus fulfilling its role as
a safe haven against economic uncertainty. One possible explanation for the negative re-
lationship between Bitcoin and the EPU in a context of low economic uncertainty could
be that those investors who bought Bitcoin will sell it again when economic policy re-
turns to normal. Overall the results regarding these two measures confirm the non-linear
relationship between Bitcoin and global uncertainty. In fact, Bitcoin can serve as a hedge
in times of tranquil financial markets but is not a safe haven in times of financial market
distress. Its role as a safe haven is only fulfilled in times when economic policy becomes
insecure.
Regarding the global financial markets variables in Model VI-VIII, their impact on
the exchange rate of Bitcoin is consistently negative. Although the impact is compara-
bly small, as the size of their parameter estimates of ∆%SPG1200, ∆%MSCI World, and
∆%MSCI EM suggest, the result indicates that Bitcoin can be used to hedge against stock
market losses at a global level, which applies to both developed and developing coun-
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tries. However, taking the previous results into consideration, Bitcoin’s hedging ability
is only likely when financial markets are rather calm.
Summarizing the results of Table 5, the findings stress the importance of news cov-
erage in driving the volatility of Bitcoin and also provide some support of the Bitcoin’s
hedge capability. While the results suggest that Bitcoin can serve as a hedge against
falling stock markets, it is also likely that it will move downwards with the markets if
global financial volatility is higher than usual. Therefore, the characterisation of Bitcoin
as a hedging instrument should be treated with caution. Although Bitcoin can serve as
a safe haven against high economic policy uncertainties, this is not the case in times of
distressed financial markets.
In Model IX, all variables enter into the estimation simultaneously. The results are
mostly robust compared to previous models. However, ∆%Gold correlatively collides
with ∆%MSCI EM, and, not surprisingly, ∆%MSCI World shows high correlation with
∆%SPG 1200 and ∆%MSCI EM. In the last model, the variables responsible for multi-
collinearity and the insignificant variable NOTX are removed, and the remaining vari-
ables perform robustly and evenly fall in line with expectations.
The performance of the non-explanatory variables is generally robust throughout
the models. The ARCH effect is well captured by the parameters γ, and the GARCH
effect suggested by the parameters β have almost diminished upon the entry of explana-
tory variables. In the last model, the half-life of volatility shocks have gone down from
99 days to 1 day, and the leverage parameters have become insignificant, pointing to the
ability of the explanatory variables to capture the volatility persistence and the leverage
effect. In comparison to the Model I without explanatory variable in Table 4, the skew-
ness fell by 1 - (|0.06|/|-0.86|) = 93%, the kurtosis by 1 - (6.63/13.48) = 51%, and the JB
test statistic by 1 - (4,868/12,428) = 61% in the final model in Table 5. This result confirms
that the use of explanatory variables has also significantly reduced the fat tail behaviour
of standardised residuals, which eventually stresses the role of the variables used in this
analysis in explaining Bitcoin’s exchange rate dynamics.
Rounding up the analysis, the empirical findings contrast with those that find that
the Bitcoin market is completely isolated from the world economy, as reported by Kris-
toufek (2013), Baek and Elbeck (2015), and Ciaian et al. (2016). The findings also contrast
these of Vidal-Tomás and Ibañez (2018) which claim that Bitcoin is not affected by the in-
ternational monetary policy. Moreover, the results disagree on the conclusions of Walther
et al. (2018) which find Bitcoin cannot serve as a hedge against a stock market downturn.
Regarding the non-linear relationship between Bitcoin and global uncertainties, the find-
ings are at odds with these of Bouri et al. (2017b) and Bouri et al. (2018b) which find that
Bitcoin act as a hedge against global financial uncertainty at higher quantiles.
Indeed, the findings support the findings of Walther et al. (2018) which states that
Bitcoin tends to move downwards with the financial markets in times of market distress
due to flight-to-quality. The findings also indicate Bitcoin’s role as a safe haven against
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economic uncertainties, to some degree consistent with Demir et al. (2018) which find a
positive relationship between Bitcoin and EPU at their lower and higher quantiles. Also,
the findings are to some degree consistent with those of Corbet et al. (2017) which find
significant evidence of Bitcoin’s exchange rate dynamics being driven by international
monetary policy announcements, albeit they focus on the volatility of Bitcoin rather than
its level, as done in this study. However, as the estimated impact of monetary policy an-
nouncements is rather unpronounced, the results do not support the idea that the global
expansionary monetary policy over the years has inflated the exchange rate of Bitcoin as
it may have done on traditional asset prices. The findings of the role of news coverage in
driving Bitcoin’s volatility is somewhat consistent with those of Polasik et al. (2015), who
find that Bitcoin’s return is driven by newspaper sentiments. Moreover, the results fall
more in line with those of Ciaian et al. (2016), Baek and Elbeck (2015), Koutmos (2018)
which state that fundamentals and Bitcoin-related specific do have a significant impact
on the exchange rate of Bitcoin. To the author’s best knowledge, this is the first paper to
examine the impact of regulation-related events on Bitcoin’s exchange rate and provide
some implications for policymakers and regulators regarding the sentiment of Bitcoin
investors towards market regulation.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have examined the Bitcoin exchange rate and the associated volatil-
ity by using an EGARCH framework with a wide range of explanatory variables. The
main findings of the paper can be summarised as follows. First, the results emphasise the
role of fundamentals and Bitcoin-related specific events in the exchange rate formation of
Bitcoin. Second, regulation-related events play a significant role in driving the exchange
rate of Bitcoin. Third, results also stress the importance of news coverage in driving the
volatility of Bitcoin. Fourth, Bitcoin may be a hedge against in times of tranquil markets
but is likely to expose to flight-to-quality as global financial uncertainty increases, there-
fore not acting as a safe haven against stock market crashes. Fifth, Bitcoin’s ability to
provide a safe haven seems to be given in times of uncertain economic policy. Overall,
the empirical findings of this paper suggest that the Bitcoin market is not entirely isolated
from the world economy.
To some extent, the randomwalk behaviour of the Bitcoin’s exchange rate return due
to its near-zero level memory and its quick reaction to singular news events support the
findings of Bartos et al. (2015) which state that the Bitcoin market follows the hypothesis
of an efficient market in its weak form. However, the assumption of a weak-efficient mar-
ket is contrasted with the existence of bubbles in the Bitcoin market which may question
the rational expectation of the investors, as being a fundamental assumption of the hy-
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pothesis of efficient market. Although Bitcoin’s volatility clustering behaviour has been
sufficiently explained by fundamentals, much of the fat tail of Bitcoin’s exchange rate is
still unexplored, suggesting that more significant explanatory variables should be con-
sidered to increase the overall explanatory power of a GARCH-type model in future re-
search. To explore further the link between Bitcoin and the world economy, multivariate
GARCH-type models can be employed to extract the conditional time-varying correla-
tions between Bitcoin and the global financial markets. The relationship between Bitcoin
andmonetary policy can also be further examined by analysing conditional time-varying
correlations between Bitcoin and Wu-Xia or Krippner shadow short rates. Overall, these
correlations may be low due to Bitcoin’s current strong isolation from the world econ-
omy, but it would be interesting to see how they would evolve in the future.
As a payment system, Bitcoin is still immature. Understanding the exchange rate
formation mechanism provides a basis for further economic discussion on the future de-
velopment of Bitcoin. In its current form, Bitcoin is unable to compete with established
payment systems due to its volatility and limited scale. From the author’s point of view,
a transformation of Bitcoin from an object of speculation to a stable online currency will
be inevitably connected to a vast expansion of Bitcoin’s supply. Whether Bitcoin will sur-
vive in the long term is uncertain but its underlying technology, the blockchain, could
permanently change the financial system.
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A Appendix
Table 6: Regulation-related events
Date Effect Country/Region Event type
2013-06-29 Positive US The US Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) issued license
to Mt. Gox the largest Bitcoin exchange at that time.
2013-11-18 Positive US The US Senate held a hearing on Bitcoin. The general consensus is
summed up by the director of the FinCEN We want to operate in a way
that does not hinder innovation.
2013-12-05 Negative CN The Peoples Bank Of China (PBOC) declared prohibiting financial institu-
tions from handling Bitcoin transactions which led to a market panic.
2014-01-27 Negative RU The Russia Central Bank recommended that Russians and legal entities
refrain from dealing with Bitcoins.
2014-03-26 Negative US The US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) declared that Bitcoin is a property
subject to tax.
2014-04-07 Negative EU The European Banking Authority (EBA) recommended that national su-
pervisory authorities discourage financial institutions from dealing visual
currencies.
2014-07-03 Negative JP The Japanese government made a cabinet decision, prohibiting banks and
securities companies from dealing Bitcoins.
2014-08-01 Positive CN The Financial Services and the Treasury of Hong Kong addressed that
Hong Kong at present has no legislation directly regulating Bitcoin and
other similar virtual currencies.
2014-10-04 Negative CN The People Bank of China’s restrictions against Bitcoin finally pressured
some Chinese banks to issue a deadline against several Bitcoin exchanges.
2015-03-06 Positive US New York State announced to release BitLicense application.
2015-09-22 Positive US New York State Department of Financial Services (NYDFS) approved the
first BitLicense application to Circle Internet Financial.
2015-10-22 Positive EU European Court of Justice (ECJ), the highest court in Europe, ruled that
Bitcoin is a payment method not a property; buying and selling Bitcoin
are tax free.
2016-02-24 Positive JP Japanese legislators officially proposed virtual currencies to be payment
methods.
2016-05-25 Positive JP Japan officially recognized Bitcoin and digital currencies as means of pay-
ment that is not a legal currency.
2016-11-29 Positive RU Russias Federal Tax Service stated that there is no legal prohibition of cryp-
tocurrencies in a document.
2017-03-24 Positive JP The Japan’s Financial Services Agency (FSA) announced that a new law
will be implemented from April.1 2017, which categorizes Bitcoin as a le-
gal payment method.
2017-03-31 Positive JP Japans Bitcoin Law Goes Into Effect Tomorrow.
2017-04-13 Negative RU Russian Central Banker: Bitcoins Legal Recognition Isnt Guaranteed.
2017-07-07 Negative PL Polish Regulators Warn Banks and Consumers on Cryptocurrency Risks.
2017-08-02 Positive US Options Exchange CBOE to Launch Cryptocurrency Derivatives in 2017.
2017-09-02 Negative CN Department of Business Administration of the PBOC stated four banning
rules on the Bitcoin exchanges. Multiple Chinese Bitcoin exchanges de-
layed or paused Bitcoin withdraw services.
2017-09-12 Negative US Bitcoin OTC Service Suspends Trading Citing China Pressure.
2017-10-03 Negative US The US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rejected the Win-
klevoss Bitcoin ETF application.
2017-12-06 Positive MX Mexican Senate passes crypto-related fintech law.
2017-12-11 Positive EU The European Central Bank (ECB)’s board member Coeure doesn’t see
macroeconomic risks from bitcoins
2017-12-13 Negative KR South Korea’s government has called an emergencymeeting to discuss the
trading of cryptocurrencies.
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Table 7: Regulation-related events - Continued
Date Effect Country/Region Event type
2017-12-14 Negative UK UK regulator warns on Bitcoin risks.
2017-12-15 Negative EU European Union states and legislators agreed on stricter rules to prevent
money laundering and terrorism financing on exchange platforms for Bit-
coin.
2017-12-17 Negative FR France’s finance minister calls for Bitcoin regulation debate at G20 sum-
mit.
2017-12-19 Negative SG Bitcoin warnings grow more strident as Singapore’s central bank urges
’extreme caution’.
2017-12-20 Negative EU European Commission warns of risks for investors and consumers from
Bitcoin.
2017-12-20 Positive US US banking regulator said on Wednesday that Bitcoin does not currently
pose a threat to the country’s banking system.
2017-12-21 Negative KR South Korea’s central bank chief warns of ’irrational exuberance’ in virtual
coin frenzy
2017-12-25 Negative IL Israel regulator seeks to ban Bitcoin firms from stock exchange.
2017-12-28 Negative KR South Korea’s government said on Thursday it will impose additional
measures to regulate speculation in cryptocurrency trading within the
country.
2017-12-29 Negative IN India’s finance ministry likens cryptocurrencies to Ponzi scheme.
2018-01-04 Negative US US SEC warns bitcoin, cryptocurrency investors at risk.
2018-01-08 Negative KR South Korea inspects six banks over virtual currency services to clients.
2018-01-12 Negative BR Brazil regulator bans funds from buying cryptocurrencies.
2018-01-18 Negative SI Slovenia’s central bank warns about virtual currency risks.
2018-01-19 Negative US US CFTC sues three virtual currency operators for fraud.
2018-01-23 Negative KR South Korea to ban cryptocurrency traders from using anonymous bank
accounts.
2018-01-25 Negative UK UK’s PM says that UK should examine criminal use of cryptocurrencies .
2018-01-31 Positive KR South Korea’s finance minister says no plans to ban cryptocurrency ex-
changes.
2018-02-06 Negative BIS chief says Bitcoin is a strong case for policy intervention.
2018-02-08 Negative EU ECB’s Executive Board member Mersch says that virtual currencies need
firm regulation.
2018-02-09 Positive CN Hong Kong’s regulator to crackdown on cryptocurrency exchanges with-
out a license or violate local securities laws.
2018-02-15 Negative US US regulator warns of cryptocurrency ’pump-and-dump’ schemes.
2018-02-21 Positive KR South Korean regulator hopes to see South Korea normalise the virtual
coin business in a self-regulatory environment.
2018-02-27 Positive KR South Korea struggles to regulate cryptocurrency market.
2018-03-02 Negative UK Bank of England’s chief says that cryptocurrencies are failing as money.
2018-03-08 Negative JP Japan’s FSA punishes seven cryptocurrency exchanges over regulatory
lapses.
2018-03-09 Negative CN People Bank of China’s governor says Bitcoin not a legitimate method of
payment.
2018-03-20 Positive G20 agrees to monitor cryptocurrencies but no action yet.
2018-04-11 Negative AU Australian money-laundering watchdog moves to regulate Bitcoin
providers.
2018-05-14 Negative EU ECB board member Mersch wants banks to segregate any virtual currency
business.
2018-06-17 Negative BIS warns about the rise of virtual currencies.
2018-06-18 Positive US NYDFS approved the BitLicense application to the payments company
Square
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Table 8: International monetary policy events
Date Effect Central Bank Event type
2011-04-07 Negative ECB The interest rate on the main refinancing operations is increased by 25 basis
points to 1.25%.
2011-07-07 Negative ECB The interest rate on the main refinancing operations is increased by 25 basis
points to 1.50%.
2011-09-21 Positive Fed Operation Twist.
2011-10-06 Positive ECB New covered bond purchase programme (CBPP2).
2011-10-06 Positive BoE Quantitative easing boosted by £75bn by Bank of England.
2011-10-27 Positive BoJ Enhancement of Monetary Easing.
2011-11-03 Positive ECB The interest rate on the main refinancing operations is dcreased by 25 basis
points to 1.25%.
2011-12-08 Positive ECB Measures to support bank lending and money market activity.
2012-02-14 Positive BoJ Enhancement of Monetary Easing.
2012-04-27 Positive BoJ Enhancement of Monetary Easing.
2012-07-05 Positive ECB The interest rate on the main refinancing operations is decreased by 25 basis
points to 0.75%.
2012-08-02 Positive ECB Outright Monetary Transactions.
2012-09-13 Positive Fed Quantitative Easing 3.
2012-09-19 Positive BoJ Enhancement of Monetary Easing.
2012-10-30 Positive BoJ Enhancement of Monetary Easing.
2012-12-20 Positive BoJ Enhancement of Monetary Easing.
2013-04-04 Positive BoJ Introduction of the Quantitative and Qualitative Monetary Easing.
2013-05-02 Positive ECB The interest rate on the main refinancing operations is decreased by 25 basis
points to 0.50%.
2013-11-07 Positive ECB The interest rate on the main refinancing operations is decreased by 25 basis
points to 0.25%.
2013-12-18 Negative Fed Fed reduces the pace of Quantitative Easing 3.
2014-06-05 Positive ECB Monetary policy measures to enhance the functioning of the monetary policy
transmission mechanism.
2014-06-05 Positive ECB The interest rate on the main refinancing operations is decreased by 10 basis
points to 0.15%.
2014-08-22 Positive ECB Draghi strongly hints at start of a QE program in the euro area.
2014-09-04 Positive ECB New covered bond purchase programme (CBPP3).
2014-09-04 Positive ECB The interest rate on the main refinancing operations is decreased by 10 basis
points to 0.05%.
2014-10-29 Negative Fed Fed concludes QE3 programme.
2014-10-31 Positive BoJ Expansion of the Quantitative and Qualitative Monetary Easing.
2015-01-22 Positive ECB Announcement of Expanded Asset Purchase Programme (APP).
2015-09-03 Positive ECB Draghi announces increase in APP purchase limit.
2015-12-03 Negative ECB The interest rate on the main refinancing operations and the interest rate on
the margginal lending facility remain unchanged at 0.05% and 0.30% respec-
tively.
2015-12-16 Negative Fed Fed increases its key interest rate, the Federal Funds Rate: 0.25%-0.50%.
2015-12-18 Positive BoJ Enhancement of Monetary Easing.
2016-01-29 Positive BoJ QQE with a Negative Interest Rate.
2016-03-10 Positive ECB The interest rate on the main refinancing operations is decreased by 5 basis
points to 0.00% and the pace of APP is to be increased by adding Corporate
Sector Purchase Programme to the APP.
2016-07-29 Positive BoJ Enhancement of Monetary Easing.
2016-08-04 Positive BoE Bank of England cuts Bank Rate to 0.25% and introduces a package of mea-
sures designed to provide additional monetary stimulus.
2016-12-08 Negative ECB ECB announces tapering of the APP.
2016-12-14 Negative Fed Fed increases its key interest rate, the Federal Funds Rate: 0.50%-0.75%.
2017-03-15 Negative Fed Fed increases its key interest rate, the Federal Funds Rate: 0.75%-1.00%.
2017-06-14 Negative Fed Fed increases its key interest rate, the Federal Funds Rate: 1.00%-1.25%.
2017-10-26 Negative ECB ECB announces further tapering of the APP.
2017-11-02 Negative BoE Bank of England increases Bank Rate to 0.50%.
2017-12-13 Negative Fed Fed increases its key interest rate, the Federal Funds Rate: 1.25%-1.50%.
2018-03-21 Negative Fed Fed increases its key interest rate, the Federal Funds Rate: 1.50%-1.75%.
2018-06-13 Negative Fed Fed increases its key interest rate, the Federal Funds Rate: 1.75%-2.00%.
2018-06-14 Negative ECB ECB announces end of the APP.
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Table 9: Bitcoin-related specific events
Date Event Type Country Event
19.12.2011 Market Positive US The Good Wife announced to air a Bitcoin-themed TV episode Bit-
coin for Dummies, after which investors bet big on the show and
drive prices to new highs.
01.03.2012 Hacking Negative US Linode, an American privately owned virtual private server
provider company, was Hacked. Over 46,000 BTC was stolen.
17.08.2012 Crime Negative US Bitcoins Savings & Trust, halted payments, which turned out to be
a Ponzi scheme.
05.09.2012 Hacking Negative US Bitfloor, which was the fourth largest exchange dealing in US dol-
lars, announced to be hacked. 24,000 BTC was stolen.
12.03.2013 Technologie Negative Bitcoin 0.8 caused a feather hard fork of Bitcoin.
14.05.2013 Investigation Negative US The US Homeland Security Investigations (DHS) seized
$2,915,507.40 from an account owned by a Mt. Gox subsidiary,
with the warrant.
02.10.2013 Investigation Negative US The US FBI seized around 26,000 BTC from Silk Road, an online
black market, during the arrest of its owner Ross William Ulbricht.
23.10.2013 Hacking Negative AU Inputs.io, an Australian Bitcoin wallet provider, was hacked. 4100
Bitcoins (worth over a million USD) was stolen.
18.12.2013 Market Negative CN Chinas biggest Bitcoin exchange at that time, BTCChina, an-
nounced to stop accepting deposits in RMB.
07.02.2014 Hacking Negative Mt. Gox, Bitstamp, and BTC-e all experienced a stoppage of trading
due to massive DDoS attacks.
24.02.2014 Hacking Negative JP Mt. Gox Closed. An alleged leaked internal document showed that
over 744,000 BTC were lost by the company.
18.07.2014 Market Positive US Dell announced to accept Bitcoin.
11.12.2014 Market Positive US Microsoft announced to accept Bitcoin.
04.01.2015 Hacking Negative LU Bitstamps operational hot wallets were hacked, and 18,866 BTCwas
stolen (roughly $5.2 million).
26.01.2015 Market Positive US Coinbase Launched an US Licensed exchange.
14.02.2015 Hacking Negative CN BTER, a Chinese top ranking Bitcoin exchange, was hacked. 7170
BTC (roughly $2.1million) was stolen.
01.08.2015 Investigation Negative JP Mark Karpeles, the CEO of the failed Bitcoin exchange Mt. Gox,
was arrested in Japan on charges of fraud and embezzlement in
relation to the collapse of Mt. Gox.
15.08.2015 Technologie Negative Bitcoin XT Fork Released and caused market fear.
31.10.2015 Market Positive UK Bitcoin featured on the front page of the magazine The Economist.
14.01.2016 Market Negative CH Mike Hearn, who had been heavily involved in the Bitcoin commu-
nity since the beginning of Bitcoin, announced to quit Bitcoin.
27.04.2016 Market Positive US Steam, a popular gaming platform, announced to accept Bitcoin.
02.08.2016 Hacking Negative CN Bitfinex was hacked, announcing that 119,756 BTC (around 72 mil-
lion) was stolen.
11.01.2017 Investigation Negative CN Chinese authorities announced plans to investigate Bitcoin ex-
changes.
02.08.2017 Markt Positive US USOptions Exchange CBOE to Launch Cryptocurrency Derivatives
in 2017.
13.11.2017 Markt Positive US US CME CEO: Bitcoin Futures Could Begin Trading As Soon As
December.
01.12.2017 Markt Positive US US CME, CBOE to Begin Bitcoin Futures Trading.
04.12.2017 Markt Positive US US CBOE to Begin Bitcoin Futures Trading December 10.
07.12.2017 Hacking Negative SK Hackers steal $64 million from cryptocurrency firm NiceHash
19.12.2017 Hacking Negative KR South Korean cryptocurrency exchange to file for bankruptcy after
hacking
21.12.2017 Markt Positive US Goldman Sachs Is Setting Up A Trading Bitcoin Desk.
18.01.2018 Market Positive US NYSE-parent ICE to launch cryptocurrency data feed.
27.01.2018 Hacking Negative JP Coincheck cryptocurrency exchange hacked, losing $530 million.
31.01.2018 Market Positive JP Japan’s Line to launch cryptocurrency exchange amid hacking
fears.
05.02.2018 Market Negative US/UK Banks in Britain and U.S. ban Bitcoin buying with credit cards
26.02.2018 Market Positive US Goldman-backed startup Circle buys major crypto exchange
Poloniex
12.03.2018 Market Positive Thomson Reuters launches bitcoin sentiment gauge.
14.03.2018 Market Negative Google bans cryptocurrency advertising.
26.03.2018 Market Negative Twitter to ban cryptocurrency advertising.
06.04.2018 Market Negative KR South Korean cryptocurrency executives detained over alleged em-
bezzlement.
25.04.2018 Market Positive US Nasdaq CEO says Nasdaq is open to cryptocurrency exchange in
future.
15.05.2018 Market Positive US Internet entrepreneurs Winklevoss’ Bitcoin exchange wins NY ap-
proval to expand.
20.06.2018 Hacking Negative KR South Korea’s Bithumb loses $32 million in digital money heist.
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